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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Anderson & Anderson Contractors v. Latimer" involves an
appeal from a circuit court judgment permitting complete retro-
active application of the 1971 amendments to the Surface Mining
and Reclamation Act2 and holding that a pre-hearing cessation of
surface mining operations upon an inspector's order was constitu-
tional. The supreme court held that the 1971 amendments could
not be applied in a completely retroactive manner by the Depart-
ment of Natural Resources, and further held West Virginia Code
§ 20-6-14a3 to be constitutional, thus allowing pre-hearing cessa-
tion of surface mining operations.'
Justice Neely initially considered "whether the 1971 amend-
ments to the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act of 1967 apply
in their entirety to surface mining operations begun under per-
mits issued before the effective date of the 1971 amendments."5
257 S.E.2d 878 (W. Va. 1979).
' W. VA. CODE § 20-6-1 to -32 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
(1978 Replacement Vol.).
4 257 S.E.2d at 882-83.
5 Id. at 880.
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The Surface Mining and Reclamation Act of 1967 was West
Virginia's first comprehensive attempt at regulating the surface
mining industry.' A provision of this act required mine operators
to comply with any subsequent amendments or regulations which
may be promulgated.7 The Act did not, however, require compli-
ance with new amendments or regulations if reclamation work
had been satisfactorily performed prior to the effective date of
the amendment or regulation.
The appellants, proprietors of various strip mining opera-
tions, argued that they were not subject to the 1971 amendments
to the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act on land where recla-
mation work had been satisfactorily performed prior to the effec-
tive date of these amendments.8 The appellees, individual mem-
bers of the reclamation commission, argued that under West
Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Regulations § 301 the
appellants would be subject to the 1971 amendments, since the
reclamation work had not been "approved" prior to the effective
date of the amendments.'
The court saw this regulation as adding an additional re-
quirement to West Virginia Code § 20-6-31,10 which provided that
work merely be satisfactorily performed.11 This additional re-
quirement rendered the 1971 amendments completely retroactive,
rather than partially retroactive as provided by the statute. Com-
plete retroactivity resulted from the fact that all reclamation
work must have been completed for an entire surface mining op-
'Id.
W. VA. CODE § 20-6-31 (1978 Replacement Vol.).
257 S.E.2d at 879-80.
* Id. at 880; West Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Regulations
§ 301 (1972) states:
Conversion - Any operator holding a valid surface mining permit
issued prior to the effective date of these regulations, shall within 60
days after the effective date thereof, convert such permit and bond or
other securities posted therefor to comply with all the provisions of Arti-
cle 6, Chapter 20, Code of West Virginia, as amended, and all rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder, if mining operations are to con-
tinue after said date. The provisions of this regulation shall not be con-
strued to require the regrading or replanting of any area where such
work was satisfactorily performed and approved prior to the effective
date of these regulations. (emphasis added).
10 (1978 Replacement Vol.).
11 257 S.E.2d at 880.
[Vol. 83
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 10
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol83/iss2/10
1980] SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENTS
eration before any could be "approved" by the Department of
Natural Resources. Therefore, it would be impossible for any sur-
face mine still operating in 1971 to have any "approved" work.12
The supreme court ruled the appellants were permitted to
avail themselves of pre-1971 standards for reclamation work
which had been "satisfactorily performed" prior to the effective
date of the 1971 amendments,13 thus eliminating the added re-
quirement created by the regulation. Justice Neely stated that
reclamation legislation should be interpreted exactly as written.14
In a second aspect of the decision, the court decided the con-
stitutionality of West Virginia Code § 20-6-14a,15 which provides
for a prehearing cessation of surface mining operations upon the
order of a surface mining reclamation inspector.16 The appellants
argued that the statute was unconstitutional because surface min-
ing inspectors are given authority to "make and apply law," and
no timely hearing to review shutdown orders is provided.1"
Justice Neely disputed the claim of inspectors having the




' W. VA. CODE § 20-6-14a (1978 Replacement Vol.) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this article, a surface-min-
ing reclamation inspector shall have the authority to order the immedi-
ate cessation of any operation where (1) any of the requirements of this
article or the rules and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto or the
orders of the director or the commission have not been complied with or
(2) the public welfare or safety calls for the immediate cessation of the
operation. Such cessation of operation shall continue until corrective
steps have been started by the operator to the satisfaction of the sur-
face-mining reclamation inspector. Any operator who believes he is ag-
grieved by the actions of the surface-mining reclamation inspector may
immediately appeal to the director, setting forth reasons why the opera-
tion should not be halted. The director shall determine when and if the
operation may continue.
Note that the proposed West Virginia Coal Mining and Reclamation Act re-
vises this section. W. VA. CODE § 20-6-1 (Cum. Supp. 1980). However, this act will
not be effective until the governor issues a proclamation based upon a finding that
the Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior has approved the West Vir-
ginia state program under § 503 of the Federal Surface Mine Control and Recla-
mation Act of 1977. 30 U.S.C. § 1253 (Supp. 1, 1977).
17 257 S.E.2d at 882.
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power to "make and apply law." He believed inspectors were
given sufficient guidance, by West Virginia Code § 20-6-118 and
regulations promulgated by the Department of Natural Re-
sources, as to when a pre-hearing cessation order is required. All
cessation orders are required to have a basis in specific statutes
and regulations19 or in protection of the public safety or welfare
from a clear danger.
20
The court then considered the appellant's assertion that
West Virginia Code § 20-6-14a violated procedural due process
guarantees. The court employed a two-fold analysis: (1) Is a pre-
cessation hearing required, and (2) if a pre-shutdown hearing is
not required does the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act pro-
vide an adequate post-cessation hearing? 21 Justice Neely applied
the balancing tests of Mathews v. Eldridge22 and North v. West
Virginia Board of Regents25 and concluded that cessation orders
temporarily halting surface mining operations are constitutional.
This conclusion was based upon the balancing of the need for
pre-cessation hearings against the possible harm to the public
welfare which could result if complex pre-cessation hearing proce-
dures were abused by coal company lawyers.
24
Although a pre-cessation hearing is not required, a mine op-
"' (Cum. Supp. 1980).
19 See, e.g., Department of Natural Resources Regulations, Series VII, 1978,
§§ 2,9 (noxious materials); §§ 6, 9 (landslides); and §§ 2, 7, 8, 9 (stream pollution).
10 257 S.E.2d at 882. See W. VA. CODE § 20-6-1 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
n Id. at 882-83.
-2 424 U.S. 319 (1975). The balancing test of Mathews u. Eldridge compares:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substi-
tute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, in-
cluding the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.
424 U.S. at 335.
" 233 S.E.2d 411 (W. Va. 1977). This balancing test provides:
First, the more valuable the right sought to be deprived, the more
safeguards will be interposed. Second, due process must generally be
given before the deprivation occurs unless a compelling public policy
dictates otherwise. Third, a temporary deprivation of rights may not re-
quire as large a measure of procedural due process protection as a per-
manent deprivation. 233 S.E.2d at 417.
" 257 S.E.2d at 883.
[Vol. 83
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erator has a right to an immediate appeal subsequent to the issu-
ance of a cessation order. This hearing must not only be adequate
procedurally, it must also be prompt. Justice Neely warned that if
the Department of Natural Resources unnecessarily delays a
post-cessation hearing, the agency may lose its jurisdiction to re-
quire cessation2
5
In a concurring opinion Justice Miller argued that the major-
ity proposition of an agency losing jurisdiction over a proceeding
because of unnecessary delay was contrary to West Virginia case
law and to the general thinking in administrative law.26 He theo-
rized that judicial termination of agency jurisdiction should "only
be considered in the most extreme cases."2 7
This case serves notice on state administrative agencies that
they must act promptly in providing post-cessation hearings or
risk losing jurisdiction over the matter if they delay for an unrea-
sonable period of time. What constitutes an unreasonable delay
will depend upon the particular facts and circumstances of the
individual case. Factors to be considered in deciding whether to
terminate an agency's jurisdiction due to delay include the harm
which the private party has suffered because of the delay, and the
effect that a termination of jurisdiction would have on the proper
function of the administrative process."5
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Thorne v.
Roush2" held that the "junior barbering" apprenticeship man-
dated by West Virginia Code § 30-27-3s3 restrained trade and cur-
25 Id. at 883-84.
26 Id. at 884.
27 Id. at 885.
's Goldman, Administrative Delay and Judicial Relief, 66 MICH. L. REv.
1423, 1453 (1968).
29 261 S.E.2d 72 (W. Va. 1979).
30 (Cum. Supp. 1980). This statute reads in part:
An applicant for licensure as a barber ... shall present satisfactory evi-
dence that he or she.., has been graduated from a school of barbering
... approved by the state board of barbers and beauticians ... and
shall transmit with his application an examination fee of twenty dollars.
The examination shall be of such character as to determine the qualifi-
cations and fitness of the applicant to practice barbering.. . , and shall
cover such subjects germane to the inquiry as the board may deem
proper. If an applicant for licensure as a barber or beautician success-
fully passes such examination and is otherwise duly qualified, as re-
1980]
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tailed individual liberty in contravention of the due process and
equal protection guarantees of the West Virginia Constitution.
The court also found the junior barber apprenticeship quota sys-
tem to be unconstitutional.
This case arose on a petition for a writ of mandamus to com-
pel the issuance of a barber's lcense to the petitioner and all
others similarly situated. The petitioner, a recent barber college
graduate licensed as a duly qualified "junior barber," had been
unable to gain employment in that capacity. Without serving a
twelve-month apprenticeship the petitioner could not be licensed
as a barber under West Virginia Code § 30-27-3. The petitioner
argued that the apprenticeship requirement was unconstitutional
since, it denied her equal protection of the law and constituted an
abuse of the state's interest in policing the barbering trade.8 1
Justice McGraw began his opinion by noting that the state's
interest in regulating the barbering profession is valid.8 2 The basis
for such regulation is the protection of the health and welfare of
West Virginia's citizens.3 3 To withstand constitutional attack, reg-
ulations must bear a reasonable relationship to a valid legislative
purpose and cannot be arbitrary or discriminatory.3'
quired by this section, the board shall license the applicant as a duly
qualified junior barber.. . . Upon proof that the holder of such a license
has served as a junior barber ... for a period of not less than twelve
months from the original date of such license, accompanied by a certifi-
cate of health from a duly licensed physician, the board shall issue to
the applicant a license 'authorizing the applicant to practice barbering
... in this state.
:1 261 S.E.2d at 73-74.
32 Id. at 74; Quesenberry v. Estep, 142 W. Va. 426, 95 S.E.2d 832 (1956); Ran-
sone v. Craft, 161 Va. 332, 170 S.E. 610 (1933). See also Mountaineer Disposal
Serv. v. Dyer, 156 W. Va. 766, 197 S.E.2d 111 (1973).
33 Doyle v. Bd. of Examiners, 219 Cal. App. 2d 504, 33 Cal. Rptr. 349 (1963).
Syllabus point number 5: "Police power is simply the power to subject individuals
to reasonable regulation so as to achieve such governmental objectives as the pub-
lic safety, health, morals and welfare." Syllabus point number 2: "Protection of
public health is the police power objective that justifies a statutory licensing sys-
tem for barbers and provision of minimum standards of education and training is
an ancillary objective."
34 261 S.E.2d at 74; State ex rel. Harris v. Calendine, 233 S.E.2d 318 (W. Va.
1977); State ex rel. Cobun v. Town of Star City, 197 S.E.2d 102 (W. Va. 1973); see
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Theoretically, the court believed an apprenticeship system is
a reasonable requirement for a newly graduated barber.3 5 In prac-
tice, however, West Virginia's statutory apprenticeship require-
ments were irrational. Justice McGraw cited the lack of any stan-
dard against which competence could be measured as the "most
critical defect."38 The statute did not establish any guidelines to
judge an apprentice's competence or require any examination at
the end of the apprenticeship period.37 Under the statute a junior
barber's ability to acquire employment as an apprentice was the
key to gaining a license, rather than the acquisition of compe-
tence. The apprenticeship requirement only provided a labor pool
capable of being exploited by licensed barbers, and failed "to con-
tribute in any demonstratable way to the welfare of the public.""
Therefore, the apprenticeship requirement was seen as re-
straining trade, curtailing individual liberty, and contravening
public policy in a manner violative of the due process and equal
protection guarantees of the West Virginia Constitution.3
The opinion made it quite clear that the court was not
against the concept of training by apprenticeship. Rather, the
court provided that an apprenticeship should be "truly of educa-
tional value" containing a standard of performance to be met or
an examination to be passed.'0
This case could have an effect on the licensing of individuals
in many occupations in West Virginia. Several licensing statutes
have apprenticeship requirements quite similar to those for bar-
bers. Occupations with questionable apprenticeship programs in-
clude funeral directors' 1 and land surveyors.' 2
The West Virginia statutory requirements governing the
" 261 S.E.2d at 74.
00 Id. at 75.
3: Id.; W. VA. CODE § 30-27-3 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
8 261 S.E.2d at 75.
, W. V.A. CONsT. art. HI, § 10. This section provides as follows: "No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ..
40 261 S.E.2d at 75.
41 Funeral directors must serve an apprenticeship of one year. W. VA. CODE
§ 30-6-5 (1980 Replacement Vol.).
42 A person who is a graduate of an accredited surveying curriculum must
also have at least two years of experience in the practice of land surveying to
become a licensed surveyor. W. VA. CODE § 30-13A-5 (1980 Replacement Vol.).
1980]
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number of apprentices who could lawfully be employed in any
one barbershop"2-1 were held in Thorne to be inconsistent with
the West Virginia Constitution's requirements for due process. 48
Justice McGraw stated that the quota system was devoid of any
reasonable basis and constituted a restriction on trade and indi-
vidual liberty." The quota system required the supervision of
three licensed barbers for every apprentice in large shops and
limited any barbershop, regardless of size, from employing more
than three apprentices. In contrast the same statute allowed
beauty shops to employ one apprentice for each licensed beauti-
cian with no limit on the total number of apprentices which could
be employed.45
The importance of Thorne v. Roush lies in the guidelines set
out by the court for licensing statutes with apprenticeship pro-
grams in West Virginia. To be valid an apprenticeship statute
should place an emphasis on the acquisition of actual knowledge
and provide a measure for testing competence acquired.46
Louis F. Williams, Jr.
42. W. VA. CODE § 30-27-7 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
43 261 S.E.2d at 76; W. VA. CONST. art. Il, § 10.
14 261 S.E.2d at 76.
41 W. VA. CoDE § 30-27-7 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
46 261 S.E.2d at 75.
[Vol. 83
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In Masinter v. WEBCO Co.,1 the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals recognized the right of minority shareholders to
relief upon a showing of oppressive conduct by those in control of
the corporation. The court held that the two forms of relief
requested, statutory dissolution and damages, did not always
embrace the same factual determinations and that each form of
relief required a different analysis. The opinion also set forth the
definition of oppressive conduct and the standards which give rise
to a cause of action for a minority shareholder. Finally, in dicta,
the court discussed a particular type of conduct known as "freeze
or squeeze out '12 which might constitute oppressive conduct.
In this case a minority shareholder in a close corporation
brought an action as the result of oppressive conduct by the other
two shareholders. The cause of action was brought under the
court's equitable powerss seeking two types of relief: (1)
1 262 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1980).
2 See F. O'NAL, "SQUEFZE-OUTS" OF MiNORrrY SHAREHOLDERS, Chapters 3-8
(1975). This book outlines various techniques to rid oneself of undesirable
business associates while also explaining methods to oppose squeeze out
techniques.
' In 1974 the West Virginia Legislature passed the West Virginia Corporation
Act [hereinafter referred to as the Corp. Act] to become effective in 1975. This
particular case is decided on the applicable corporation sections existing prior to
the Corp. Act. Prior to the Corp. Act there were no statutes concerning remedies
and causes of action for oppressive conduct. Although this action was probably
brought under the statutory jurisdiction for dissolution granted under W. VA.
CODE § 31-1-81 (1931), now W. VA. CODE § 31-1-134 (1975 Replacement Vol.), the
court indicates several common law decisions upon which it grants equity
jurisdiction for lesser forms of relief other than dissolution. The new Corp. Act
includes a statute which explicitly states that oppressive conduct by those in
control of a corporation may give rise to a cause of action. W. VA. CODE § 31-1-41
(1975 Replacement Vol.) states:
(a) Any of the circuit courts or inferior courts of record with general
civil jurisdiction shall have full power to liquidate the assets and
business or affairs of a corporation in an action by a shareholder or
member when it is established:
(2) that the acts of the directors or those in control of the
9
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dissolution of the corporation and (2) damages as a result of the
alleged oppression. The circuit court granted the majority
shareholders' motion for summary judgment. The West Virginia
court reversed, finding that a genuine dispute existed and that
the lower court mistakenly applied the standards for dissolution
to the claim of damages for oppressive conduct.
The court viewed dissolution as a severe remedy merited only
in the most extreme cases.4 Courts have recognized that in some
cases a minority shareholder has a right to bring suit to obtain
appropriate relief other than dissolution.5 Since there are varying
degirees of injury to minority shareholders, each of which might
merit a different form of relief, the court concluded that the
factual determination required to order dissolution is not
necessarily the same factual determination required to award
damages.
Although the oppression of minority shareholders can
constitute cause for dissolution, a less stringent test is applicable
for granting lesser relief. Neither the court nor the statute for
dissolution explicitly sets forth the determination that would be
sufficient cause for dissolution.6 The court does note several
factors to be considered: whether injury is being conducted
systematically or continuously, whether future injuries may be
prevented, and whether alternative forms of relief are available.7
corporation are illegal, oppressive or fraudulent; (emphasis
added).
While this statute does not apply to this particular case, the court defined the
term "oppressive conduct" and the applicable standards with this statute in mind.
There is another advantage to a minority shareholder in bringing the action under
W. VA. CODE § 31-1-41 (1975 Replacement Vol.) for oppressive conduct rather
than W. VA. CODE § 31-1-134 (1975 Replacement Vol.) for dissolution. There is no
requirement that the shareholder own one-fifth of the outstanding shares for an
action under oppressive conduct.
4 262 S.E.2d at 439.
1 Id. The court discusses several cases where relief to minority shareholders
had been granted in case decisions. But none of these was the result of oppressive
conduct by majority shareholders. Most of the decisions resulted from a breach of
fiduciary duty by the directors or majority shareholders.
I See Williams v. Croft Notion Co., 82 W. Va. 549, 96 S.E. 929 (1918)
(example of what constitutes sufficient cause for dissolution).
7 262 S.E.2d at 439, citing Hornstein, A Remedy for Corporate Abuse -
Judicial Power to Wind Up a Corporation at the Suit of a Minority Stockholder,
40 COLUM. L. Rav. 220, 236 (1940).
[Vol. 83
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To determine whether the alleged conduct merited relief, the
court first defined the term "oppressive conduct." The court had
previously taken the logical step of extending the fiduciary duty
owed to the minority shareholders by directors and officers to
majority shareholders.8 Next the court examined the nature of
the fiduciary duty as outlined in previous West ,Virginia
decisions9 and the definition of oppressive conduct formed by
other jurisdictions. 10 The court concluded that the fiduciary duty
of those in control of a corporation to minority shareholders was
analagous to the good faith and fair dealing standard required of
other fiduciaries."
The West Virginia court held that an attempt to "freeze'or
squeeze out" a minority shareholder may constitute oppressive
conduct,1 2 but concluded that the record in this case was
inadequate to make such a determination. The court did point
out two broad factual patterns from which oppressive conduct
might be found. The first occurs where the minority shareholder
has made substantially the same capital investment as the other
shareholders with the expectation of remunerative employment
with the corporation. The second is where the minority
shareholder was either originally involved in the formation of the
corporation or was induced to invest in it with the expectation of
8 Id. at 438. See Meadows v. Bradshaw-Diehl Co., 139 W. Va. 569, 81 S.E.2d
63 (1954).
9 Id. at 438-40. The court sets out the equivalent standard from West
Virginia decisions. See 262 S.E.2d at 440 n.9 citing Young v. Columbia Oil Co.,
110 W. Va. 364, 370, 158 S.E. 678, 681 (1931) where the court stated: "They must
manage its business with a view to promote the common interest, and cannot
directly or indirectly derive personal profit or advantage from their position which
is not shared by all the stockholders."
10 Annot., 56 A.L.R.3d 358 (1974). See also Annot., 83 A.L.R.3d 458 § 11
(1978).
1, 262 S.E.2d at 440. The fiduciary duty owed by majority stockholders,
directors, or officers is a much broader standard than that considered under
oppressive conduct. The duty of good faith and fair dealing is only one aspect of
the fiduciary duty owed.
1 A freeze-out is not necessarily improper. A freeze-out may be proper where
the minority shareholders are uncooperative and unreasonable to the extent that
the majority interests are justified in removing them. See O'NEAL, supra note 2
§ 101. Note that the oppressive conduct the court seems to be most concerned
with is the financial squeeze.
19801
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some return on the investment."3 In both situations the minority
shareholders receive some return for a period of time only to find
that any return, either by dividend or salary, has been severed
thr-ough no fault of their own, and not as a result of any
legitimate business purpose. 4
To sustain a cause of action for oppressive conduct the
minority shareholder must demonstrate the connection between
the alleged action taken by the majority shareholder and a claim
under the freeze out theory.1 5 Although the court did not attempt
to set out remedies for oppressive conduct, it did provide some
guidance for possible forms of relief by citing one of the leading
cases in the area, Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc.,"0
which sets forth ten forms of relief as alternatives to outright
dissolution.
Joel Patrick Jones
13 262 S.E.2d at 441.
", The inclusion of legitimate business purpose presents a difficult burden to
overcome and the court has indicated it will permit a rather broad latitude in the
conduct of corporate affairs absent fraud or bad faith. Id. at 438.
'5 Id. at 447.
'6 264 Or. 614, 632-33, 507 P.2d 387, 395-96 (1973).
[Vol. 83
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I. IMPLIED CAUSE OF ACTION
West Virginia took a big step toward doctrinal clarity on the
issue of implied causes of action in Hurley v. Allied Chemical
Corp.1 The implied cause of action doctrine allows courts to cre-
ate civil remedies for violations of statutes without express legis-
lative permission.
2
Before Hurley, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
relied on various mechanisms to determine whether a statute im-
plied a cause of action. In negligence cases, the court has held
that violation of a statute is prima facie evidence of negligence.3
The court has also said that in order to state a cause of action, a
plaintiff must be within the class of persons that the statute in-
tended to protect.4 In other instances, the court has relied on arti-
cle III, section 17 of the West Virginia Constitution which pro-
vides that the courts shall be open to remedy injuries inflicted
upon a person, his property, or reputation.
5
The Hurley case arose when the defendant allegedly refused
to employ the plaintiff solely on the basis of the plaintiff's history
of treatment at a mental health facility.6 The case came to the
West Virginia court on certified questions. The court was asked
to decide whether the denial of employment in the private sector
solely on the basis of the applicant having received mental health
services violates West Virginia Code § 27-5-9(a)7 and gives rise to
- 262 S.E.2d 757 (W Va. 1980).
2 See Note, Implied Causes of Action in the State Courts, 30 STAN. L. REv.
1243 (1978).
3 See, e.g., Costello v. City of Wheeling, 145 W. Va. 455, 117 S.E.2d 513
(1960).
' Steiner v. Muldrew, 114 W. Va. 801, 173 S.E. 891 (1934).
8 State Human Rights Comm'n v. Pearlman Realty Agency, 239 S.E.2d 145
(W. Va. 1977).
6 262 S.E. 2d at 759.
7 W. VA. CODE § 27-5-9(a) (1980 Replacement Vol.) provides the following:
(a) No person shall be deprived of any civil right solely by reason of his
receipt of services for mental illness, mental retardation or addiction,
nor shall the receipt of such services modify or vary any civil right of
13
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an implied private cause of action; and whether such denial vio-
lates state public policy and gives rise to a cause of action under
Harless v. First National Bank.6
The court quickly dispensed with the plaintiff's second con-
tention by distinguishing the Hurley situation from that of
Harless. The latter case dealt with an employer's retaliatory dis-
charge of an employee who exercised a substantive public right.
The court found that a crucial element of a cause of action under
Harless is that the plaintiff must actually be an employee of the
defendant.9
Focusing on the plaintiffs first contention, the court re-
viewed the United States Supreme Court's decision in Cort v.
Ash10 and adopted the Ash four-pronged analysis to determine
-whether a given statute implies a cause of action.11 The West Vir-
ginia court set forth the following new test: (1) the plaintiff must
be a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was en-
acted; (2) consideration must be given to whether the legislature
intended a private cause of action; (3) an analysis must be made
-to determine whether a private cause of action is consistent with
he underlying purposes of the legislative scheme; and (4) such
private cause of action must not intrude into an area traditionally
the domain of the federal government. 3 Applying this multi-
tiered analysis to the facts, the court concluded that West Vir-
ginia Code § 27-5-9(a) creates an implied private cause of action
against a private employer who denies employment to an appli-
cant solely on the basis that such individual received services for
such person, including, but not limited to, civil service status and ap-
pointment, the right to register for and to vote at elections, the right to
acquire and to dispose of property, the right to execute instruments or
rights relating to the granting, forfeiture or denial of a license, permit,
privilege or benefit pursuant to any law, but a person who has been ad-
judged incompetent pursuant to article eleven [§ 27-11-1 et seq.] of this
chapter and who has not been restored to legal competency may be de-
prived of such rights. Involuntary commitment pursuant to this article
shall not of itself relieve the patient of legal capacity.
8 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
9 262 S.E.2d at 759.
10 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
11 Id. at 78.
12 262 S.E.2d at 763.
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mental illness, mental retardation, or addiction."3 The case was
remanded to the circuit court for further adjudication.
In its analysis, the West Virginia court found that the plain-
tiff had received services from a mental health facility and there-
fore was a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was
enacted.14 As to the second prong, the court looked to the circum-
stances of the statute's enactment in order to determine legisla-
tive intent. Because the legislature did not furnish an administra-
tive remedy and did not indicate that private relief was
unobtainable, the court held that the legislature must have in-
tended to imply a private cause of action.15 In regard to the third
tier, the court found an enforcement vacuum to exist in West Vir-
ginia Code § 27-5-9(a) and that a private cause of action provides
the means of complementing and enforcing the legislative
scheme.18 In reference to the fourth prong of the analysis, the
court found that federal legislation in the area of the handi-
capped applies generally only to the federal government and
those institutions which receive federal funds. A private cause of
action under West Virginia Code § 27-5-9(a) would help fill a
needed gap in state remedies rather than intrude on the federal
government's domain.1 7
II. PRESS' ACCESs To PRE-TRIAL HEARINGS
An issue of first impression arose in State ex rel. The Her-
ald-Mail Co. v. Hon. John M. Hamilton.8 In this original writ of
prohibition, the relator, Herald-Mail Co., sought to prohibit the
enforcement of a closure order. The Circuit Court of Hardy
County had granted a criminal defendant's closure motion in
which the defendant indicated that he was willing to waive his
right to a public pre-trial hearing in order to avoid publicity that
might jeopardize his right to a fair trial. The closure order oper-
ated so as to prohibit the press from entering pre-trial hearings
regarding the admissibility at trial of statements allegedly made
by the defendant to third parties and of evidence of defendant's
,3 Id. at 765.
14 Id. at 763.
15 Id. at 764.
16 Id.
17 Id.
Is 267 S.E.2d 544 (W.Va. 1980).
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state of mind at the time these statements were made.
Relying on article HI, sections 14 and 17 of the West Virginia
Constitution, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found
an independent right flowing to the public and press to attend
pre-trial criminal proceedings. 1' Although State ex rel. Varney v.
Ellis20 had enunciated this view as it related to a public right to
access in a trial,21 Herald-Mail goes further by acknowledging
that the press is clothed with the same constitutional right to ac-
cess as the public, based on its special status of gatherer and dis-
tributor of information. 22 The court relies on State ex rel. Daily
Mail Publishing Co. v. Smith 2 for the proposition that "a robust,
tnfettered and creative press is indispensable to government by
free discussion and to the intelligent operation of a democratic
society.' 1'
In addition, Herald-Mail extends the Varney right of public
access to criminal proceedings to encompass pre-trial hearings.2'
Expanding the state constitutional mandate that trials of crimes
be public, the West Virginia court determined that the term
"trial" cannot be viewed in its limited sense. A pre-trial hearing
often is similar to a trial without a jury in that witnesses are
sworn in, evidence is heard, and the judge must apply the law to
the facts. For these reasons, the high court found that the press
must have the same right to access to pre-trial hearings as in a
19 Id. at 547. art. II, § 14 of the West Virginia Constitution provides in perti-
nent part:
Trials of crimes, and misdemeanors, unless herein otherwise provided,
shall be by a jury of twelve men, public, without unreasonable delay,
and in the county where the alleged offence was committed, unless upon
petition of the accused, and for good cause shown, it is removed to some
other county...
a-t. I, § 17 provides: "The courts of this State shall be open, and every person,
for an injury done to him, in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy
by due course of law;, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or
delay."
20 149 W. Va. 522, 142 S.E.2d 63 (1965).
21 Id. at 523, 142 S.E.2d at 65. The court held that a judgment rendered pur-
suant to a trial held in a jailer's office was void in that it violated art. III, § 14 of
the public access clause of the West Virginia Constitution.
267 S.E.2d at 549.
23 248 S.E.2d 269 (W. Va. 1978), aft'd, 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
24 Id. at 272.
35 267 S.E.2d at 550.
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The Herald-Mail majority does not go so far as to allow the
press an unfettered right to attend pre-trial hearings. 27 If a show-
ing of widespread adverse publicity amounting to a clear likeli-
hood of irreparable damage to the defendant's right to a fair trial
can be made out, the trial court could close a pre-trial hearing to
the press.28 Factors bearing on the issue of irreparable damage
include "the extent of prior hostile publicity, the probability that
the issues involved at the pre-trial hearing will further aggravate
the adverse publicity, and whether traditional judicial techniques
to insulate the jury from the consequences of such publicity will
ameliorate the problem."" Because the Hardy County Circuit
Court ordered a closure of a pre-trial hearing without the requi-
site showing of irreparable damage to defendant's right to a fair
trial, the West Virginia court issued a moulded writ prohibiting
the enforcement of the trial court's closure order, but enabling
the trial court to hold a further hearing on closure in which the
above-stated test should be applied.30
In addition to irreparable damage closure, the court made a
subdued reference to "special circumstances" which might neces-
sitate closure of a pre-trial hearing.31 Although the court did not
elaborate, "special circumstances" may translate to those situa-
tions in which confidential criminal investigatory materials are
involved.32
26 Id.
27 Justice McGraw, in his concurring opinion, would not place any limitations
on the press' right to access to a pre-trial hearing. "The right of access to govern-
mental proceedings and the right to a fair trial do not conflict. The judicial article
of the Constitution charges this Court to devise procedures and remedies to en-
sure fair trials." Id. at 552.
18 Id. at 551.
9 Id.
0 Id. at 552.
Id. at 551, n. 17.
See United States v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1973) (exclusion
of public and defendant from that part of a pre-trial suppression hearing dealing
with confidential federal hijacking "profile" does not abridge constitutional
rights); United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835 (3d Cir. 1978) (closure of suppres-
sion hearing regarding intercepted communications under title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq., is justifiable
limitation of public access to criminal proceeding).
1980]
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Herald-Mail was decided almost one year subsequent to
Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale8 a United States Supreme
Court decision based on similar facts but in which a plurality
reached the opposite result. Gannett held that the sixth amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution conferred a right to a public
trial only upon the accused and not on the public or press.3 4 Con-
sequently, the Supreme Court decided the press has no indepen-
dent sixth amendment right to attend a pre-trial hearing.35
Gannett acknowledged that some state constitutions provide
for an independent public right to trial proceedings, but reiter-
ated that no such right exists in the sixth amendment of the Fed-
eral Constitution. Herald-Mail reviewed each of the state consti-
tutions that embodied the English common law rule of open
proceedings and concluded that the uniform interpretation in
those states was that the constitutional language conferred an in-
dependent right on the public to attend judicial proceedings, and
did not simply confer a personal right upon the defendant to de-
mand a public proceeding.8 6
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals acknowledged
that the competing interests and rights of litigants and the press
were such as to make it an impossible task to foresee all of the
repercussions of Herald-Mail. The complex nature of constitu-
tional rights would appear to mandate a clarification of those
competing interests in future decisions.
Jill Kramer Traina
33 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
34 Id. at 391.
" However, the press and public do have first and fourteenth amendment
rights under the Federal Constitution to attend criminal trials. See Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980) (Gannett distinguished).
36 267 S.E.2d at 548.
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CONTRACTS
Implied and express warranties of merchantability as found
in the Uniform Commercial Code have received varied
interpretations due to the "open ended" drafting of the warranty
provisions.' The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
recently interpreted these warranty provisions and accompanying
sections2 in Mountaineer Contractors, Inc. v. Mountain State
Mack, Inc.3 In this case, Mountaineer Contractors agreed to
purchase four used bulldozers from Mountain State Mack, the
appellant. The sales agreement was made after an officer of
Mountaineer Contractors viewed the machines in a working
condition, but when the appellant delivered the equipment, it was
inoperative. Mountaineer Contractors sued on breach of contract
and received a jury verdict.
On appeal, the seller raised two issues concerning the
warranty provisions of the U.C.C. and also questioned the
assessment of damages arising from the breach. The Supreme
Court of Appeals affirmed finding both an implied and express
warranty of merchantability and held claims for incidental and
consequential damages to be appropriate due to special
circumstances.
When the buyer observed the bulldozers, he agreed with the
agent of the appellant that the equipment was in good working
order. Following this cursory inspection, the appellant offered for
review the service records of the equipment; the buyer declined to
examine them. The appellant contended that this examination
and refusal to inspect the service records waived the implied
warranty of merchantability as a matter of law.4
In construing the "modification of warranty" section of the
U.C.C. 5 the court held that where there is evidence to support an
J. WHTEr & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 8 (2d ed. 1980),,.
2 W. VA. CODE §§ 46-2-202, 313, 314, 316, 714, 715 (1966).
3 268 S.E.2d 886 (W.Va. 1980).
4 W. VA. CODE §§ 46-2-314, -316(3)(b) (1966).
' W. VA. CODE § 46-2-316 (1966).
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inference that the defects arose after the buyer's examination, the
issue of whether this examination constituted a waiver is a
question of fact. Concerning the refusal to examine the service
records, Justice McGraw, speaking for the court, concluded "[tihe
Code clearly refers only to the buyer's refusal to inspect the goods
themselves" and the refusal to examine the service records would
not act as waiver of implied warranty of merchantability.'
This decision departs from early West Virginia cases
concerning the existence of an implied warranty of
merchantability where the sale is of a definite existing chattel
capable of being inspected.7 In that line of cases the court
espoused the doctrine of "caveat emptor" with the only exception
arising when the vendee has had no opportunity to inspect the
property before purchase.8 The West Virginia court, in 1968,
began its retreat from the doctrine of "caveat emptor" in a case
in which the dispute preceded the enactment of the U.C.C.
Influenced by the Code, the court held that an inspection or
opportunity for inspection does not necessarily preclude an
implied warranty against latent defects.9
The agreement of sale in Mountaineer Contractors was
reduced to writing in a security agreement which included a
merger clause and was signed by the buyer. Upon delivery of the
faulty bulldozers, the buyer immediately informed the seller that
he would not accept the equipment in its present state. The seller
agreed to assume the cost of all expenses incurred for repair, thus
effecting an acceptance from the buyer.
In examining the pertinent language of West Virginia Code
§ 46-2-202,10 the court interpreted the provision to exclude
6 268 S.E.2d at 890.
See, e.g., Watkins v. Angotti, 65 W. Va. 193, 63 S.E. 969 (1909); Lambert v.
Armentrout, 65 W. Va. 375, 64 S.E. 260 (1909); Hood v. Bloch, 29 W. Va. 244, 11
S.:E. 910 (1886).
, See Wilson v. Wiggin, 73 W. Va. 560, 81 S.E. 842 (1914).
9 Nettles v. Imperial Distributors, Inc., 152 W. Va. 9, 159 S.E.2d 206 (1968).
10 (1966). Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of
the parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended
by the parties as final expression of their agreement with respect to such
terms as are included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of
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"evidence of oral terms only in the case of agreements made
contemporaneously with the transaction embodied in the written
agreement."" The court then held that where a buyer accepts
defective goods in reliance upon a promise to repair, such
promises constitute express warranties.12 The court reasoned that
subsequent assertions made by the seller constituted a
subsequent oral modification of the contract and thus would not
be excluded as evidence by the parol evidence rule.
Involved in the court's analysis of the existence of express
warranties was the aspect of reliance on the seller's assertions.
However, West Virginia Code § 46-2-31313 requires only that the
promise become "part of the basis of the bargain." This suggests
that reliance need not be shown to prove the existence of an
express warranty;14 all that would need to be shown is an
affirmance by the seller which is false.
In examining the existence of an express warranty, the West
Virginia court did not address the issue of the Statute of Frauds.
This statute requires that the sale of goods for a price of $500.00
or more must be in writing.15 Whether the oral subsequent
modification would fall under this statute is a question open to
some debate, but the appellant failed to raise the issue. 6
n 268 S.E.2d at 892.
12 Id.
13 (1966).
14 See, e.g., Interco, Inc. v. Randustrial Corp., 533 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. App.
1976); Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643
(1973); W. VA. CODE § 46-2-313 (1966). Comment three of this section states that,
"In actual practice affirmations of fact made by the seller about the goods during
a bargain are regarded as part of the description of those goods; hence no
particular reliance on such statements needs to be shown in order to weave them
into the fabric of the agreement."
15 W. VA. CODE § 46-2-201 (1966).
16 W. VA. CODE § 46-2-209 (1966) states that an agreement modifying a
contract needs no consideration; however, the requirement of the Statute of
Frauds (§ 46-2-201) must be satisfied if the contract is to be modified within its
provisions. In Mountaineer Contractors there was an oral modification to the
sales agreement which could arguably be in excess of $500.00. Applying the
Statute of Frauds, such a modification could not be made orally. However, W. VA.
CODE § 46-2-209(4) states that if the modification is not valid as against the
Statute of Frauds it can operate as a waiver of the original terms in the contract.
It is not clear how such a waiver would operate where the modification involved,
as it did in Mountaineer Contractors, contains terms unrelated to those in the
1980]
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On the issue of damages, the trial court instructed the jury
that it may consider money spent by the buyer for parts and
labor used in repairing the bulldozers and any loss sustained by
the inability to use the equipment.17 The West Virginia court
affirmed this instruction, stating that the usual measure of
damages is not intended to be exclusive. The court found "special
circumstances" existed in this case which permitted the recovery
of incidental and consequential damages proximately resulting
from the breach.18 This holding is consistent with the trend of
recent cases dealing with a seller's breach and the resulting
damages to the buyer.1" Lost profits proximately caused by
seller's breach are also not uncommon and have been recoverable




17 268 S.E.2d at 893.
18 The "special circumstances" were that the transaction took place during
the "coal boom" of 1974, and at that time it was nearly impossible to purchase
mining equipment of any kind, either new or used.
1" See Bill Branch Chevrolet, Inc. v. Redmond, 378 So.2d 319 (Fla. 1980);
Coyle Chevrolet Co. v. Carrier, 397 N.E.2d 1283 (Ind. 1979); Alliance Tractor v.
Lukens Tool & Die Co., 204 Neb. 248, 281 N.W.2d 778 (1979).
20 See, e.g., Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., 438 F.2d 500 (8th Cir. 1971).
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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
In the past year the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
has dealt extensively with issues raised in the area of criminal
law. The court has recently decided several cases in each of the
following categories: double jeopardy; evidentiary issues; juvenile
dispositions; and post conviction problems. Many, if not most, of
the cases involve constitutional challenges to existing West
Virginia law and procedure. In its disposition of the issues raised,
the court appears to be furthering the trend of affording the
criminally accused greater substantive protection and more
procedural rights.
I. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
In State ex rel. Dowdy v. Robinson1 the defendant was
charged with breaking and entering a building. The address was
listed in the indictment as "220 22nd Street." However, the proof
adduced at trial by the prosecution showed that the actual ad-
dress of the building was 200 22nd Street. The defendant argued
at trial that this constituted a fatal variance between the indict-
ment and the proof and moved for a directed verdict of acquittal.
The trial court sustained the motion, over objection, and directed
the jury to find the defendant not guilty.
Several months later the defendant was again charged with
breaking and entering, but this time the indictment listed the
correct address adduced by the prosecution at the previous trial.
The defendant then sought a writ from the West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals to prohibit the circuit court from trying
him again on the grounds that he was being tried a second time
for the same offense in contravention of the double jeopardy pro-
visions of the United States and West Virginia Constitutions.
The double jeopardy provisions contained in the fifth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution and in article III, section
5 of the West Virginia Constitution prohibit both multiple trials
1 257 S.E.2d 167 (W. Va. 1979). See Comment, supra, p. 259.
23
et al.: Survey of Developments in West Virginia Law: 1980
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1980
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
and multiple punishments for the "same offense."'2 The threshold
issue, then, in any double jeopardy inquiry is the manner in
which "same offense" is to be defined. In Blockburger v. United
Statess the United States Supreme Court adopted the "same evi-
dence" test for defining the fifth amendment phrase "same of-
fense" when applied to multiple counts in one trial. The test was
stated as "where the same act or transaction constitutes a viola-
tion of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to
determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether
each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.'
This test was extended to apply to multiple prosecutions as well
as multiple counts in Brown v. Ohio.5 Thus the basic issue in
Dowdy, whether both indictments charged the "same offense,"
could easily have been resolved by reference to the Blockburger
test.
However, Chief Justice Neely recognized that the West Vir-
ginia court may formulate its own standard under the West Vir-
ginia Constitution so long as minimum federal constitutional
standards are adhered to. Thus, he seized upon the "same trans-
action" test explained in the concurring opinion of Justice Bren-
nan in Brown,6 and the policy enunciated in Green v. United
States,7 to formulate a new rule for defining "same offense" for
double jeopardy purposes.
The rule adopted in Dowdy is that the court will use both the
"same evidence" test and the "same transaction" test for deter-
2 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); Conner v. Griffith, 238 S.E.
2d 529 (W. Va. 1977).
3 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
4 Id. at 304.
5 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
6 Justice Brennan urged adoption of a rule holding that "all changes growing
out of conduct constituting a 'single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transac-
tion' must be tried in a single proceeding." Id. at 170, quoting Ashe v. Swenson,
397 U.S. 436, 453 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
7 355 U.S. 184 (1957). The policy is thus stated:
The underlying idea... is that the State with all its resources and
power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrass-
ment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing
state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that
even though innocent he may be found guilty. 355 U.S. at 187.
[Vol. 83
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mining whether the "same offense" is involved for double jeop-
ardy purposes, with the accompanying requirement that which-
ever test affords the defendant greater protection must be
applied. Applying the "same transaction" test to the facts of
Dowdy, the court agreed with the defendant's claim of unconsti-
tutional double jeopardy.
A possible source of confusion in the Dowdy decision is that
its facts do not appear to warrant application of the "same trans-
action" test. Justice Brennan first urged adoption of the "same
transaction" test in Ashe v. Swenson.8 In that case four men
robbed six poker players. After one of the accused was acquitted
of robbing one of the poker players, he was tried for having
robbed another poker player. The "same transaction" test was
suggested by Brennan in response to the "tendency of modern
criminal legislation to divide the phases of a criminal transaction
into numerous separate crimes ... [that permit] multiple prose-
cutions for an essentially unitary criminal episode,"' and the in-
ability of the "same evidence" test to prohibit "multiple prosecu-
tions where a single transaction is divisible into chronologically
discrete crimes."10 No such considerations exist, however, under
the facts of Dowdy, and existing double jeopardy principles could
have prevented retrial of the defendant. Thus, the court's use of
the "same transaction" test in these circumstances--where there
is clearly only one criminal act on the part of the defen-
dant-could result in confusion on the part of those attempting
to apply the test in the future.
In addition to formulating the new rule, the Dowdy decision
also held West Virginia Code § 61-11-1411 unconstitutional. This
section permitted reindictment and trial of a person acquitted of
an offense on the grounds of a variance between the allegations
and the proof. The court noted that one clear principle which has
emerged from recent United States Supreme Court opinions is
that after a judgment acquitting a defendant, no retrial on the
same offense is permissible no matter how erroneous the acquittal
might have been.
8 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
9 Id. at 452 (Brennan, J., concurring).
10 Id. at 451 (Brennan, J., concurring).
,1 (1977 Replacement VoL).
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Justice Miller, in dissent, completely disagreed with the ma-
jority's disposition of the case. He conceded that the defendant
could not be retried if he had been acquitted, but asserted that no
acquittal was present in this case. Miller would define acquittal as
a "resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements
of the offense charged,'1 2 and stated that when, as here, there is
no finding of a failure of proof of an essential element of the of-
fense charged, no double jeopardy inquiry is necessary.' s
The confusion created by the Dowdy decision was acknowl-
edged by the supreme court of appeals in State ex rel. Johnson v.
Hamilton.14 Chief Justice Neely, again writing for the majority,
stated in Johnson that the Dowdy rule "was intended to establish
an orderly, prospective procedure for avoiding multiple prosecu-
tions for successive criminal acts arising out of the same general
criminal transaction."' 5 Regarding the nature of the "same trans-
action" component of the Dowdy rule, Neely explained that the
"same transaction" test "goes to the issue of multiple trials for
'2 State ex rel. Dowdy v. Robinson, 257 S.E.2d 167, 172 (W. Va. 1979) (Miller,
J., dissenting) quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564,
571 (1978).
13The majority opinion agrees with Miller's position to the extent that the
trial judge should not have directed a verdict of acquittal because of the variance
between the indictment and the proof. Rather, the correct procedure would have
been either to strike the address in the original indictment as surplusage on the
ground that the remainder of the indictment fully informed the defendant of the
charges against him, or to grant a mistrial for manifest necessity. However accord-
ing to the majority, once a verdict of acquittal is entered, the court must treat it
as valid no matter how erroneous its grounds for "the Supreme Court has ac-
corded magic to a directed verdict of acquittal which we cannot escape." 257
S.E.2d at 171.
14 266 S.E.2d 125 (W. Va. 1980). In Johnson the defendant was accused of the
murder of a father and son during the same general criminal transaction. He was
charged in two separate indictments. After he was convicted of first-degree mur-
der of the son, the defendant sought a writ of prohibition to prohibit a second
trial for the murder of the father. The Dowdy rule would clearly have prohibited a
second trial, however, the first trial occurred two months before the Dowdy opin-
ion was handed down. Therefore, the basic issue was whether the Dowdy opinion
was to be applied retroactively. The supreme court of appeals recognized that the
reliance of the prosecution on the then state of the law (which would have permit-
ted separate trials) is an important element in considering whether to apply the
rule retroactively, and that no substantial impairment of the truth finding func-
tion was involved (citing Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971)). The
court decided that retroactive application of the Dowdy rule was not required.
"8 Id. at 128 (emphasis added).
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the 'same offense' but it does not preclude separate punishments
for separate crimes."1* Justice Miller argued in his concurring
opinion that this position completely ignores the fundamental is-
sue of how to define "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes.
If the "same transaction" test does not preclude separate punish-
ments for the charges it requires to be consolidated in one trial,
then it has nothing to do with double jeopardy, for the double
jeopardy clause prohibits both multiple trials and multiple pun-
ishments. If the defendant can be punished twice, then he is not
being punished for the "same offense" and the double jeopardy
clause does not attach. Thus, Justice Miller would conclude that
the "same transaction" test appears merely to establish a rule of
joinder procedure that is wholly divorced from the double jeop-
ardy inquiry.17
The operation of the Dowdy "same transaction" test, as mod-
ified by Johnson, is explained by the court with an example re-
sembling the facts of Johnson:
In a case involving murders, such as the one currently under
consideration, we hold that in the future " a person must be
tried for both alleged murders in the same trial unless he
moves for a severance," but that he may be punished for both
murders separately because they are separate and distinct
offenses. 0
This statement reinforces the notion that the "same transac-
tion" test is unrelated to the double jeopardy definition of "same
offense," but only establishes a rule of joinder procedure. For if
the two murders in Chief Justice Neely's example are "separate
and distinct offenses" the double jeopardy proscription against
multiple trials would have no application. The "same transac-
tion" test then does not define "same offense" for double jeop-
ardy purposes; it only indicates when separate offenses must be
tried together.21
1, Id. (emphasis added).
17 Id. (Miller, J., dissenting).
" See generally note 14, supra.
1, A motion for severance by the defendant contemplates an automatic waiver
of a subsequent plea of double jeopardy. 266 S.E.2d at 129.
20 Id. at 128 (footnotes added).
11 As a practical matter the Dowdy-Johnson "same transaction" test affords
the criminally accused greater protection only to the extent that the state fails to
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As a result of the Johnson opinion, the law of double jeop-
ardy appears to be in basically the same position it was prior to
the Dowdy decision regarding the definition of "same offense."
The "same evidence" test will be applied to determine whether
the "same offense" is involved in the alleged multiple trials or
punishments. Under Johnson, the "same transaction" test serves
only to compel the state to prosecute in a single proceeding all
the charges against a defendant arising out of the same criminal
episode.
One problem which should be solved by the Dowdy and
Johnson decisions is the one presented by State ex rel. Leonard
v. Hey.22 The defendant in Leonard was indicted in 1967 for mur-
der and robbery. He pled guilty to murder and was sentenced to
life in the penitentiary without mercy. In 1974 his sentence was
commuted to life with mercy. Consequently, he became eligible
for parole in 1979, but he was then indicted for a malicious
wounding that allegedly occurred in the same criminal episode
that resulted in the 1967 indictments.2 3 The trial court denied the
defendant's motion to quash the indictment. Subsequently he
sought a writ of prohibition from the supreme court of appeals to
prohibit his further prosecution on the basis that the indictment
violated his double jeopardy, speedy trial, and due process rights.
The court held, in an opinion written by Justice Harshbarger,
that the eleven year delay between arrest and indictment was
presumptively prejudicial to the defendant and violated his right
to due process of law, but because the presumption is rebuttable
the court remanded the case to give the state an opportunity to
prove the delay reasonable.
In determining whether the eleven year delay between arrest
and indictment involved in Leonard violated due process, the
court considered various opinions of the United States Supreme
Court. Although many courts have interpreted United States v.
prosecute separate crimes arising from the "same transaction" in one trial. If the
state brings all its charges in a single proceeding the defendant may move to sever
the charges, but by so moving he waives future double jeopardy objections.
:2 269 S.E.2d 394 (W. Va. 1980).
13 This situation should not occur in the future because the Dowdy rule re-
quires all of the crimes arising out of the same general transaction to be prose-
cuted in a single proceeding.
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Marion24 as establishing the criteria for when prosecutorial delay
constitutes a violation of due process, 2 5 the Leonard court did not
read Marion as establishing any "universally applicable tests."26
The court did find pertinent and helpful Justice Brennan's opin-
ion in Dickey v. Florida,27 where it is suggested that governmen-
tal delay be tested by weighing the importance of the postpone-
ment with the length of the delay and its potential for prejudice.28
A similar balancing approach is contained in syllabus point
two of the Leonard decision wherein the trial court is directed to
weigh "the reasons for delay against the impact of the delay upon
the defendant's ability to defend himself."2 9 However the court
cautions that such a balancing test is "suspect, because it puts to
judicial subjective judgment, with its consequential risks of over-
looking or undervaluing important matters, the liberty of peo-
ple."30 The court did not apply the balancing test to the facts of
Leonard because it determined that an eleven year delay consti-
tutes prima facie prejudice to the defendant and an infringement
upon his due process rights."1
State ex rel. Kincaid v. Spillers3 2 is a case which closely re-
sembles the facts of Dowdy. In Kincaid the defendant was in-
dicted and convicted for burglary. He then moved for a judgment
of acquittal because of a fatal variance between the indictment
and the proof. The trial court granted his motion and entered
judgment. However, upon reconsidering, the court overruled its
order and reinstated the jury verdict during the same term. The
24 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
25 Some courts interpreting Marion "have held that a violation of due process
only occurs if there is actual, substantial prejudice and intentional prosecutorial
misconduct; others, that the existence of one of the factors can deny a defendant
due process." 269 S.E.2d at 396 (emphasis by the court).
28 Id.
27 398 U.S. 30 (1970).
28 Id. at 52 (Brennan, J., concurring).
29 269 S.E.2d at 394.
30 Id. at 398.
31 Justice Miller, concurring, is in agreement with the majority's decision to
place the burden on the state to justify the delay. He points out that to "force the
defendant to bear the burdens of an eleven-year preindictment delay . . . would
be to improperly allow the prosecution to override the court's authority to impose
concurrent sentencing, the Governor's authority to commute, and the parole
board's authority to parole." 269 S.E.2d at 401 (Miller, J., concurring).
32 268 S.E.2d 137 (W. Va. 1980).
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defendant subsequently petitioned the supreme court of appeals
contending that revocation of the acquittal order violated his
double jeopardy rights.
Despite its apparent similarity, this case is easily distin-
guished from Dowdy, since here there is no necessity for a second
trial. A claim of double jeopardy under these circumstances-
where there is no danger of multiple trials or multiple punish-
ments-is simply inappropriate. The thrust of the defendant's ar-
gument must then rest on the proposition that the trial court
lacked the jurisdiction to set aside its order of acquittal.
There are two limitations to a trial court's ability in a crimi-
nal case to set aside a judgment during the same term at which
the judgment was entered. It may do so if the defendant has not
satisfied in whole or in part the judgment and if no increase in
the penalty imposed is involved.33 In the present case the first
limitation is not applicable, and the second is not offended be-
cause there is "no increase in the penalty when the court simply
reinstates the jury's finding of guilty.' 'u Accordingly the court
denied the petitioner's writ.
In short, the Kincaid case is a clarification of what consti-
tutes an "acquittal" for double jeopardy purposes. Dowdy recog-
nized that double jeopardy could have been avoided if the trial
judge, rather than directing a verdict of acquittal, had corrected
the variance between the indictment and proof by means of sur-
plusage or manifest necessity.3 5 Here the trial judge effected the
same result by reinstating the jury verdict during the same term,
and the directed verdict of acquittal was not "accorded magic."3 6
Since the Kincaid court recognizes that "reversal by a trial
court itself . . . does not offend double jeopardy principles '"
where the defendant will not be subjected to multiple trials, its
statement "that a defendant who challenges conviction by appeal
or post-verdict motion voluntarily subjects himself to reconsider-
" Id. at 141-42 citing State ex re!. Williams v. Rifle, 127 W. Va. 573, 34
S.E.2d 21 (1945) and State ex re. Roberts v. Tucker, 143 W. Va. 114, 100 S.E.2d
550 (1957).
" 268 S.E.2d at 142.
35 See note 13, supra.
See State ex ref. Dowdy v. Robinson, 257 S.E.2d 167, 171 (W. Va. 1979).
37 268 S.E.2d at 141.
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ation of matters that involve jeopardy to his liberty," and "[b]y
so choosing . . . waives his double jeopardy rights,"38 could be
viewed as dicta and not as a substantive change in double jeop-
ardy law.
II. EVIDENCE
State v. Rowe"9 established, for the first time, specific guide-
lines for admission in criminal trials of photographs depicting
gruesome, or revolting physical injuries. Before State v. Rowe was
decided, admission of such photographs in West Virginia was
solely within the discretion of the trial judge, whose decision was
upheld on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of that
discretion. 0
Generally, trial judges had been determining the admissibil-
ity of arguably prejudicial photographs by considering the materi-
ality and relevancy of the scene depicted.41 These considerations
did not, however, preclude the admission of "gruesome" photo-
graphs solely on the basis of their possible inflammatory impact
on the jury.4 2 Rather, the court performed a balancing test be-
tween the advantages of admitting all evidence having probative
value and the possible detriment to the criminal defendant's right
to an impartial, uninflamed jury.43
In Rowe, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held
that admission of photographs deemed to be "gruesome" 44 re-
quired a showing by the prosecution, not only of probative value,
but of "essential evidentiary value.' 4 5 The court rested this hold-
ing on the assumption that photographs whose impact "may"
38 Id. at 141.
89 259 S.E.2d 26 (W. Va. 1979).
40 State v. Sette, 242 S.E.2d 464 (W. Va. 1978); State v. Wooldridge, 129 W.
Va. 448, 40 S.E.2d 899 (1946).
4 State v. Sette, 242 S.E.2d 464 (W. Va. 1978).
4' See, e.g., State v. Whitt, 129 W. Va. 187, 40 S.E.2d 319 (1946) ("ghastly"
photos admitted without analysis); State v. Goins, 120 W. Va. 605, 199 S.E. 873
(1938) (photos of homicide victim admitted without analysis).
48 State v. Sette, 242 S.E.2d 464 (W. Va. 1978).
4 Facts relevant in determining if a photograph is "gruesome," include
whether it depicts blood and gore (especially color photographs), contorted facial
features, a victim's body after autopsy, or enlargements of bodily parts emphasiz-
ing revolting aspects. State v. Rowe, 259 S.E.2d 26, 28 (W. Va. 1979).
"I Id. at 28.
1980]
31
et al.: Survey of Developments in West Virginia Law: 1980
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1980
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
prejudice or inflame the jury should be inadmissible unless they
are essential to the state's case.46 Photos which merely depict the
condition of the victim were not of essential value, the court said,
especially when expert testimony was available upon these
issues. 47
The court did note that grisly photographs are not per se
inadmissible. Once there has been a preliminary finding that the
photographs are gruesome, a presumption of inflammatory effect
attaches, shifting the burden to the prosecution to show "essen-
tial evidentiary value" to protect the criminal defendant from a
prejudiced decision.48
State v. Brewster9 addressed the issue of whether a criminal
defendant may be physically restrained with manacles during a
jury trial, and if so, under what circumstances. Prior to this deci-
sion, State v. Allen"0 held that where the record was silent as to
the necessity for retaining manacles upon the prisoner, an appel-
late court would presume the court below exercised sound and
reasonable discretion in allowing such restraint.
State ex rel. McMannis v. Mohn51 recently addressed the
analogous issue of whether a criminal defendant could be com-
pelled to appear in court clad in prison uniform. Citing Estelle v.
Williams,52 in which the United States Supreme Court held there
was a constitutional right to wear unidentifiable non-prison cloth-
ing, the West Virginia court acknowledged that the criminal de-
fendant can be substantially prejudiced by being forced to appear
before the jury marked as a prisoner.53
4' Id. Other authority cited included: Young v. State, 234 So.2d 341 (Fla.
1970); State v. Clark, 218 Kan. 18, 542 P.2d 291 (1975); Breshers v. State, 572 P.2d
561 (Okla. 1977); Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 372 A.2d 687 (1977).
One photograph in State v. Rowe was upheld as admissible upon this appeal be-
cause its essential evidentiary value was demonstrated by the need to compare a
bloody heel print in one photo to the soles of defendant's shoes.
" 259 S.E.2d at 29, citing with approval Commonwealth v. Chacko, 480 Pa.
504, 391 A.2d 999 (1978).
" 259 S.E.2d at 28.
" 261 S.E.2d 77 (W. Va. 1979).
" 45 W. Va. 65, 30 S.E. 209 (1898).
254 S.E.2d 805 (W. Va. 1979).
'r 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
254 S.E.2d at 809-10.
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The court in Brewster felt the position enunciated in
McMannis was not inconsistent with the general rule disapprov-
ing restraints established in Allen. The court stated, however,
that since the verdict in a criminal trial is substantially affected
by the defendant's outward appearance of credibility, some evi-
dence must be placed in the record showing that some immediate
necessity existed for the use of restraints." In order that this re-
quired showing be observed, the court overruled Allen to the ex-
tent that no presumption of a sound exercise of discretion would
henceforth be made where no evidence of necessity had been
placed in the record.55
With regard to showing necessity, the Brewster court
adopted nine factors set forth in the A.B.A. Advisory Committee
Comments on Criminal Trials"6 including such considerations as
the gravity of the present charge, the person's character and past
record, threats to cause disturbance, and risk of mob violence,
among others.
Defendant Brewster argued to the court that his freedom to
appear without manacles should be elevated to the status of a
constitutional right, relying on the holding in Estelle v. Williams.
The court disagreed with this contention, however, stating that
while the wearing of prison clothing in court serves no useful
state purpose, there were certain circumstances which would jus-
tify the use of restraints at trial, and that the required showing of
necessity adequately insured defendant's substantive rights.5 7
State v. Lawson5s held that a criminal defendant accused of
rape is entitled to evidence in the form of blood grouping test
results where the victim becomes pregnant and claims the rape
was her sole act of intercourse. Since the test results might pro-
vide definite exculpatory evidence, the Lawson court held that
the defendant is entitled to a continuance in order to obtain the
" 261 S.E.2d at 81.
5" Id. at 81-82. The court did not believe that the failure in this case to de-
velop a record with regard to necessity for restraint required reversal; instead it
remanded with directions to develop such evidence, with the stipulation that
should the trial court make a finding of necessity, the verdict would be affirmed.
:' "Standards Relating to Trial by Jury" at 96 n. 9 (Approved Draft, 1968).
7 261 S.E.2d at 81.
53 267 S.E.2d 438 (W. Va. 1980).
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blood grouping test results.ss
Despite this holding, the court in Lawson did not feel the
trial court's refusal to grant a continuance warranted a reversal.60
Using State v. Brewster" as authority, the court allowed a condi-
tional remand. If the test results establish non-paternity, defen-
dant's motion for a new trial would be granted. 2
West Virginia Code § 17C-5A-5(c)6 s which provides that one
tenth of one percent or more by weight of alcohol in a criminal
defendant's blood shall establish prima facie evidence of intoxica-
tion, was found constitutional in State v. Ball." Such a presump-
tion does not offend notions of due process, the court said, since
the blood-alcohol ratio is not an element of the crime of drunk
driving, but merely provides a statutory definition of intoxication.
Thus, West Virginia Code § 17C-5A-5(c)" does not relieve the
prosecutioD of proving a material element of the offense
charged;"6 it merely relieves the state of the burden of producing
an expert at every trial to testify as to what effect a given per-
centage of alcohol would have upon the defendant's ability to
drive. 67
The Ball court declined to rest its holding upon principles
applicable to presumptions for a second reason.68 The court said
5" See People v. Tashman, 233 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1962) and People v. Bynon, 146
Cal. App. 2d 7, 303 P.2d 75 (1956).
60 267 S.E.2d at 439.
" 261 S.E.2d 77 (W. Va. 1979).
" 267 S.E.2d at 440.
" (1974 Replacement Vol.).
264 S.E.2d 844 (W. Va. 1980).
" (1974 Replacement Vol.).
"See State v. Pendry, 227 S.E.2d 210 (W. Va. 1976).
' 264 S.E.2d at 846.
" Id. at 847. Chief Justice Neely, in footnote one, reviewed recent West Vir-
ginia and U.S. Supreme Court holdings with regard to statutory presumptions, but
declined to elucidate upon the application of those principles to the facts of this
case. The validity of a jury instruction indicating that possession of stolen prop-
erty supports an inference of guilt was considered in State v. Stone, 268 S.E.2d 50
(W. Va. 1980). The court commented that so long as the trial judge informed the
jury that possession was not of itself prima facie evidence of guilt, and was only to
be considered in conjunction with other facts and circumstances of the case, an
instruction stating that such "possession ... is a circumstance tending to show
that the possessor is a thief. . ." is constitutional. 268 S.E.2d at 55. Although a
qualified instruction was not given in Stone, it is unclear what effect this had on
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the blood-alcohol ratio would not be a presumption of guilt since
the jury was entitled to disregard it if they found the person hav-
ing the stated alcohol content in his blood was not in fact intoxi-
cated. The "presumption" would merely support a jury verdict of
guilty.8
H. PROCEDURE
In State v. Milam e the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals explored the interrelationship between an insanity defense.
and the voluntariness of a confession in a criminal case. Since
1966 the rule in West Virginia has been that a confession must be
voluntary and that its voluntariness must be established in an in
camera hearing.71 In Milam the trial court had held such a hear-
ing to determine the voluntariness of the defendant's confession,
but denied the defendant the opportunity to, introduce psychiat-
ric testimony at the hearing to show that his confession was invol-
untary because he was insane at the time he gave it.72 The su-
preme court, relying on Blackburn v. Alabama,7' held this to be
error. Blackburn had held that where the defendant's sanity at
the time he gave the confession is in issue, it is error to admit the
confession without considering the sanity issue at the in camera
hearing.
However, the Milam court did not read Blackburn as requir-
ing that whenever the state seeks to introduce a confession it
must produce evidence of sanity, because there is a presumption
that a person is sane. This presumption disappears, however, once
the defendant introduces some evidence of insanity, and the bur-
den shifts to the state to prove his sanity by a preponderance of
the evidence.
The court .in Milam pointed out that the burden of proof on
the issue of sanity at an in camera hearing to establish the volun-
tariness of a confession does not coincide with the burden of
the court's decision to grant a new trial, since other fatal procedural defects were
present.
" See, e.g., Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
70 260 S.E.2d 295 (W. Va. 1979).
71 State v. Fortner, 150 W. Va. 571, 148 S.E.2d 669 (1966).
72 The defendant's principal defense at trial was insanity.
73 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
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proof at trial. Should the accused offer evidence at trial that he
was insane, the presumption of sanity disappears, and the burden
fall.s upon the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was sane at the time he committed the offense.7 ' To do
otherwise would have the effect of requiring the defendant "to
establish his innocence, by proving that he is not guilty of the
crime charged. '7' However, the defendant's sanity, as it relates to
the voluntariness of a confession, need only be established by a
preponderance of the evidence at the in camera hearing. 6
State v. Haverty"7 addressed the question whether a criminal
defendant's sixth amendment right to call witnesses on his own
behalf requires the state to grant immunity to a defense witness
when he claims a fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation.7 8 The United States Supreme Court has yet to address
this issue,79 but a few jurisdictions" have determined that sixth
amendment rights require immunity in order to make crucial
exculpatory evidence available to the defendant in certain
circumstances.81
West Virginia Code § 57-5-282 gives the trial court discretion
to grant immunity when "the ends of justice may be promoted by
1, See Edwards v. Leverette, 258 S.E.2d 436 (W. Va. 1979). The Milam court
found that the state failed to carry this burden. The defendant offered the testi-
mony of a doctor at trial to the effect that he was "probably" insane at the time
he committed the offense. The failure of the state to produce any countervailing
evidence was deemed fatal to its case. Moreover, the court concluded that the
failure of the state to rebut the defendant's insanity beyond a reasonable doubt
resulted in an evidentiary insufficiency that bars retrial under double jeopardy
principles. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978) and State v. Frazier, 252
S.E.2d 39 (W. Va. 1979).
75 Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 487 (1895).
11 See State v. Vance, 250 S.E.2d 146 (W. Va. 1978); State v. Starr, 216
S.E.2d 242, 249 (W. Va. 1975), citing Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
77 267 S.E.2d 727 (W. Va. 1980).
78 Id. at 731.
11 Id. at 732.
1o See, e.g., Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980). For cases
refusing to grant immunity under these circumstances, see 267 S.E.2d at 732.
81 The conditions set forth in Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d at 972, are
that the witness be named, and particulars of his testimony be given; the witness
be available; the defendant makes a convincing showing that the testimony is both
clearly exculpatory and essential to his case, and testimony is not ambiguous, cu-
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compelling such testimony or evidence." The West Virginia court
did not rule upon whether § 57-5-2 could be activated by petition
of the defendant or, as is the usual case, the prosecution,s be-
cause it found that the defendant had in any case failed to make
the showing required under Virgin Islands v. Smiths" which he
had cited.
The court did not expressly reject this application of the
statute, but it did indirectly disapprove it by noting that such a
holding would bring on an "immunity bath" for coparticipants in
criminal activities.85 Nevertheless, the fact that the court mea-
sured defendant's case against the standards set forth in Virgin
Islands v. Smith indicated that a petition setting forth these req-
uisites could provide the basis for adopting that rule.
IV. JUVENIE PROCEEDINGS
State ex rel. S.J.C. v. Fox" clarified guidelines for juvenile
dispositions undertaken pursuant to West Virginia Code § 49-5-
13.817 This section requires that, should incarceration be ordered,
the juvenile court make findings demonstrating that "no less re-
strictive alternative would accomplish the requisite rehabilitation
of the child."8' The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
voided a dispositional order for incarceration entered by the cir-
cuit court because it was deficient in the requisite "findings" 89 in
that it failed to adequately demonstrate commitment to a secure
83 The Haverty court noted that one reason why this issue is not decided in
the defendant's favor is that many immunity statutes provide for immunity only
upon petition by the executive branch of the government. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§§ 6002-03 (1976). W. VA. CODE § 57-5-2, however, does not include language to
this effect, but merely vests discretion to grant immunity in the trial court.
- 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980). See notes 80 and 81, supra.
85 267 S.E.2d at 732.
86 268 S.E.2d 56 (W. Va. 1980).
67 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
as W. VA. CODE § 49-5-13(b)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
89 The court cited State v. M.M., 256 S.E.2d 549 at 556 (W. Va. 1979) for the
definition of "finding" as that term should be construed'in the language of W. VA.
CODE § 49-5-13(b)(5). That case held that a "finding" is more than a finding of
fact, but rather resembles a conclusion of law in that it bases itself on findings of
fact (meaning statements of facts in evidence or facts properly inferable therefrom
relating directly to factors required to be considered by statute) and should con-
stitute "clear and convincing proof" of the conclusion drawn. 258 S.E.2d at 58 n.2.
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facility to be the least restrictive alternative for rehabilitation.9
The circuit court had cited three facts in support of its order:
The relator's codefendants were incarcerated; the relator had
been on "unofficial" probation in an adjoining county on another
offense; the offense with which relator was charged was a serious
one.91 The court found only one of these factors, the gravity of
the offense, to be a proper consideration for a dispositional
decision.
The court stated unequivocally that the sentences of the co-
defendants were immaterial to a determination of "least restric-
tive alternatives," since this inquiry is of necessity based upon the
individual circumstances of each juvenile. 2 Further, the defen-
dant's personal history upon which the disposition decision is
based must include that period of time between the date of the
offense and the date of the dispositional hearing.93 The court did
not comment directly on the previous "unofficial probation." It
did, however, "question the propriety of considering alleged de-
linquent acts which have never been charged .... ,,94
The third factor, that of the gravity of the offense, the court
held to be a proper consideration, but not one which, standing
alone, would ever support an order of incarceration. 5 The princi-
ple carried throughout this opinion was that incarceration is a
most extreme measure for juvenile disposition, one which will not
be upheld as the "least restrictive alternative" unless express
findings are made which are clearly supported by evidence in the
record and which give no undue weight to impermissible factors.
State ex rel. D. D. H. v. Dostert" closely followed State ex
rel. S.J.C. v. Fox and expanded on principles established and im-
plied therein by setting forth a comprehensive scheme for inter-
90 This holding reflects the extension to juvenile dispositions of State ex rel.
E.D. v. Aldredge, 245 S.E.2d 849 (W. Va. 1978), in which the failure to make ex-
press findings rendered void an order to transfer a proceeding from juvenile to
criminal jurisdiction. 268 S.E.2d at 58-59.
9 Id. at 59.
Id. at 59 n.3, citing Walker v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 289, 183 S.E.2d 739
(1971).
,3 Id. at 61.
I Id. at 60.
" Id.
269 S.E.2d 401 (W. Va. 1980).
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preting the recent statutory revisions in the juvenile law, in par-
ticular, the "least restrictive dispositional alternative."97 State ex
rel. D.D.H. v. Dostert undertook a philosophical examination of
the goals behind disposition of juvenile offenders and set forth a
detailed plan for implementation of the revised statutes and for
coordination of the component parts of the process.
The court discussed the purposes behind the statute,98 then
balanced the competing interests of society for a crime-free envi-
ronment, and of the child for protection of his "liberty interest."
The court stated that offenses by juveniles result from one or
both of two causes: environment and free will."9 Although a state
cannot hope to control each child's choices, the court said it can
and should alter and improve that environment through disposi-
tional decisions. 00
Although West Virginia is "clearly committed to the rehabili-
tative model,"10 1 the court's recognition of free will as a cause of
juvenile delinquency and deference to the practicalities of law
enforcement compelled it to leave open the alternative of incar-
ceration in extreme cases of non-rehabilitable juveniles.0 1 A child
who shows "a consistent course of noncooperation, particularly
when combined with a predilection to commit dangerous or
destructive acts ... justifies the court in resorting to
commitment. 1 03
The finding requirement imposed by State ex rel. S.J.C. v.
Fox attempts to insure that no juvenile is committed to a secure
facility unless the preceding standard is clearly shown, and sup-
ported by the evidence. To further insure that the least restrictive
alternative for rehabilitation is chosen, the court explored the du-
ties of juvenile justice system participants. Stringent and explicit
requirements were imposed upon court-appointed counsel, the
welfare worker, the court and the child.104
7 W. VA. CODE § 49-5-13(b) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
" W. VA. CODE § 49-1-1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
" 269 S.E.2d at 411.
,00 Id. at 411-12.
,o See State ex rel. Harris v. Calendine, 233 S.E.2d 318, 325 (W. Va. 1977).
02 269 S.E.2d at 410.
103 Id. at 414.
04 All of these responsibilities bear generally on the requirement that the
least restrictive alternative be utilized: counsel is to locate alternatives, and take
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V. POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS
During its 1979-80 term, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals dealt with the problem of defining and clarifying due
process requirements applicable to probation, parole and recidi-
vist proceedings. While reaffirming its position, and that of the
United States Supreme Court, that-the revocation of probation or
parole does not require the full panoply of rights due a person in
a criminal proceeding, 10 5 the court stressed that: a preliminary
probation revocation hearing must be afforded a probationer
without unreasonable delay as soon as possible after his arrest, 100
the fourteenth amendment due process clause requires that a per-
son be given written notice of alleged probation violations, 10 7 and
in order to reach the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals for
a probation revocation hearing, the person must come via habeas
corpus.108 The court also held that, because West Virginia's parole
statute0 9 creates a reasonable expectation interest in parole, the
parole release interview must satisfy the following requirements:
notice to the accused, access to information in his record, a per-
sonal appearance, a written record of the interview, and if parole
is denied, a written statement of the reason(s) for such denial.110
Juveniles are entitled to all the constitutional protections af-
forded an adult in parole revocation proceedings, and are given an
additional measure of protection by a higher standard of proof
than that required in adult parole revocation proceedings."' The
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment also serves to
initial steps toward having the juvenile admitted; the welfare worker is to ascer-
tain whether the offenses have resulted from forces which the social service de-
partments might correct; the court is to investigate and make findings; and the
child is to make an affirmative obligation to cooperate. 269 S.E.2d at 412-15.
101 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471 (1972); Louk v. Haynes, 223 S.E.2d 780 (W. Va. 1976).
'o State ex rel. Ostrander v. Wilt, 262 S.E.2d 420 (W. Va. 1980).
107 State v. Fraley, 258 S.E.2d 129 (W. Va. 1979).
108 Sigman v. Whyte, 268 S.E.2d 603 (W. Va. 1980).
109 W. VA. CODE § 62-12-13 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
"o Tasker v. Mohn, 267 S.E.2d 183 (W. Va. 1980).
. State ex rel. J.R. v. MacQueen, 259 S.E.2d 420, 423 (W. Va. 1979). W. VA.
CODE § 62-12-19 (1977 Replacement Vol.) provides that violation of parole by an
adult may be proved if it appears to the "satisfaction of the board that the parolee
has violated any condition" of his parole. W. VA. CODE § 49-5-14 (Cum. Supp.
1979) requires "clear and convincing proof of substantial violation" before a juve-
nile parole may be revoked.
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protect an accused prosecuted as an habitual criminal. Where the
person's identity in a recidivist proceeding is the key factual
issue, he is entitled to the same right as the person in a criminal
case not to be subjected to an unduly suggestive identification
procedure. 112
In construing the language of West Virginia's post-conviction
bail statute, 1 3 the court has extended existing law and overruled
in part the 1978 case of Conley v. Dingess,'I which held that
post-conviction bail was prohibited for persons convicted of
armed robbery, inasmuch as they were subject to life imprison-
ment. A person convicted of armed robbery, but not sentenced to
life imprisonment, may now be eligible for post-conviction bail
under the statute.115
Finally, the court held that in order for a person to withdraw
a guilty plea prior to sentencing, where breach of a plea bargain is
not in issue, the person generally need only show any fair and just
reason."' However, if the state can show that it will suffer sub-
stantial prejudice if the guilty plea is withdrawn, the court should
consider such prejudice in determining whether to grant the mo-
tion to withdraw the guilty plea.
A. Probation Proceedings
In State ex rel. Ostrander v. Wilt,117 the defendant had been
placed on probation in June 1976, for three years upon certain
terms and conditions. In January 1979, a petition was filed stating
that the probationer was residing outside the state without the
permission of the court, that he had been convicted of certain
crimes and had failed to pay court costs. A warrant issued for his
arrest, and he was returned to West Virginia on May 24, 1979.
The petitioner contended that he was denied due process in
that the state failed to provide him with a preliminary and final
revocation hearing prior to expiration of the probationary period
and the state failed to provide him with a preliminary hearing for
112 State v. Vance, 262 S.E.2d 423 (W. Va. 1980).
" W. VA. CODE § 62-1C-1(b) (1977 Replacement Vol.).
114 250 S.E.2d 136 (W. Va. 1978).
State ex rel. Faircloth v. Catlett, 267 S.E.2d 736 (W. Va. 1980).
116 State v. Olish, 266 S.E.2d 134 (W. Va. 1980).
17 262 S.E.2d 420 (W. Va. 1980).
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probation violations within a reasonable time.
The court found the lapse of time between the defendant's
arrest and the hearing, forty-seven days, was largely due to the
actions of petitioner and his counsel. Having determined this, the
court then examined an ad hoc balancing test first set forth in
Barker v. Wingo118 which utilized three factors: length of and rea-
son for the delay, probationer's assertion of his right, and
prejudice to the defendant.119 After weighing these three factors,
the court found that, although the petitioner quickly asserted his
right to a hearing, he alleged no prejudice caused by delay. The
actions of his counsel delayed matters and there was even some
question as to whether the petitioner had actually signed a waiver
of the hearing in the presence of his counsel. Hence, the forty-
seven day delay was not unreasonable, as it was due to actions of
the petitioner.
The first of petitioner's contentions was perhaps the more
important of the two. Although a case on point had already been
resolved in the Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit, the West
Virginia court had never specifically ruled on whether a circuit
court has jurisdiction to revoke probation subsequent to the expi-
ration of the probation period. The answer is no in most cases,
but there are exceptions to this rule where certain circumstances
exist. Gholston v. Boles220 involved a probationer who fled the
state and was not returned to West Virginia until his probation
period had expired. His probation was revoked, and he sought a
writ of habeas corpus from the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals, which denied relief without an opinion. Judge Haynes-
worth, writing for the Fourth Circuit, concluded that the West
Virginia court recognized an exception to the general rule, and
construed the violation of probation statute as authorizing com-
mitment after the expiration of the probation period. The West
Virginia court ratified Judge Haynesworth's decision, citing the
following language from his opinion: "[s]uch statutes would ap-
pear perverted if so construed that a probationer could flee the
jurisdiction and immunize himself from all consequences of his
violation of his probation if successful in avoiding execution of an
118 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
119 262 S.E.2d at 422.
10 305 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1962).
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arrest warrant until the original probationary period had
expired." '21
State v. Fraley12 2 deals with the form of the written notice
requirement necessitated by Louk v. Haynes.23 The petitioner
contended that certain violations presented at-the final revocation
proceeding were not included in the petition for revocation of
probation. Therefore, he had no notice and no opportunity to pre-
pare a rebuttal to the charges. The court held that, since evidence
about the guilty pleas to other crimes was presented at the pre-
liminary hearing, transcribed and furnished to petitioner's coun-
sel, who was also present at the preliminary hearing, the defen-
dant had ample notice and opportunity to prepare a rebuttal. In
dicta, the court mentions that "[ilt would be better to state all
alleged violations in an original petition; however, due process no-
tice was given."11 2' So long as the state can show that the defen-
dant had ample time and opportunity to prepare his case, the
form of written notice seems irrelevant.
The court, acting in its supervisory capacity, discusses a tan-
gential issue not questioned by the defendant, but raised by the
facts, in a footnote.12 1 The probation officer petitioned for defen-
dant's arrest a mere two weeks before the end of the probationary
period, yet the facts show that Fraley had violated his probation
over a long period of time. The court stated that the inattention
of the probation officer was inexcusable, as close supervision is an
integral part of the theory of probation.
In Sigman v. Whyte, ' " the supreme court of appeals dis-
cusses at length the nature of a review of a probation revocation
hearing.1 27 The petitioner in Sigman contended that a petition in
habeas corpus was not "an adequate substitute for an appeal,"
1
"
but the court disagreed, basing its conclusion on the fact that a
defendant whose probation has been revoked is entitled to ap-
121 262 S.E.2d at 423.
12 258 S.E.2d 129 (W. Va. 1979).
123 223 S.E.2d 780 (W. Va. 1976).
124 258-S.E.2d at 131.
" Id. at 130 n.2.
116 268 S.E.2d 603 (W. Va. 1980).
12 W. VA. CODE § 62-12-10 (1977 Replacement Vol.), the probation violation
statute, sets forth no standard for revocation.
128 268 S.E.2d at 606.
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pointment of counsel 129 and will have assistance in the prepara-
tion of his habeas corpus petition. If a prima facie case of illegal
parole revocation is made on the habeas corpus petition, a tran-
script of the probation revocation proceeding will be made avail-
able to defendant and his counsel, but the state is not required to
provide a transcript in every routine case.
In discussing the nature of the hearing required, the court
mentions that persons who are facing a probation revocation pro-
ceeding for violation of a criminal law also face a second proceed-
ing for commission of the crime itself. A question is raised as to
whether the state must conduct a criminal proceeding and
achieve a conviction before the probation may be revoked. The
statute dealing with probation violation, West Virginia Code § 62-
11-10,130 does not speak to this issue, but "our statute on parole
violation, West Virginia Code § 62-12-191s' could be read to re-
quire that parole cannot be revoked for commission of a criminal
offense unless defendant has been convicted of that offense. 132
The court, however, chose to differentiate between probation and
parole in this situation, and ruled that a conviction is not re-
quired to revoke probation.133
In order that the proceedings not be abused by authorities,
the court again differentiated between probation and parole in re-
quiring that the evidence against the defendant be proven by a
clear preponderance of the evidence in probation revocations.
The standard for parole revocation requires only a showing to the
"satisfaction of the board" that the parolee violated a condition
of his parole.13 4 Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required,
the court again basing its decision on the Morrissey v. Brewer33
statement that a parolee/probationer has been deprived of only a
conditional liberty.
129 State ex rel. Strickland v. Melton, 152 W. Va. 500, 165 S.E.2d 90 (1968).
130 (1977 Replacement Vol.).
1 (1977 Replacement Vol.).
132 268 S.E.2d at 607 n.10.
133 Id. at 607.
13' W. VA. CODE § 62-12-19 (1977 Replacement Vol.).
.3- 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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Tasker v. Mohn1 3"' deals with the nature of the due process
protection for release on parole. For the first time, it is recognized
in West Virginia that expectation of release on parole is a sub-
stantial liberty interest which generates due process rights. The
basic due process rights which apply to every parole release inter-
view are notice of the date and hour of the interview, access to
information in defendant's record, right to appear in person and
give oral and documentary evidence, record for purposes of judi-
cial review, and written reason(s), if parole is denied.1 3 7 West
Virginia Code § 62-12-13(d) 1" requires, in addition, that "the
board of parole shall have before it an authentic copy of or report
on the prisoner's current criminal record" and other details which
would have a bearing on the board's decision (attitude, industrial
record in prison, physical and mental examinations, etc.) while
West Virginia Code § 62-12-13(c) 13' requires the parole board to
adopt rules governing the procedure for granting parole.
In Tasker, the West Virginia Board of Parole failed to follow
not only the legislatively mandated procedure, but also its own
rules with regard to evaluations of prisoners, and the petitioner
appealed from a denial of parole. The question was mooted by
Tasker's release on parole subsequent to oral arguments before
the court, but several important points were discussed. First, in
order that the notice element of due process be met, the court
will require that any administrative board follow its own rules
and regulations, or those relying on the rules will be misled. Sec-
ond, in order to make review effective, a written record of the
interview, made by recording or stenographic means, must be
compiled. This ensures that the court will have material upon
which to base a conclusion as to whether the board's actions were
arbitrary or capricious. Third, in keeping with the rehabilitative
goal of the probation/parole system, a prisoner is entitled to know
why his request for parole was denied, so that he may remedy any
behavioral problems before a future interview. The West Virginia
court, in adopting the view that the expectation of parole is a
11 267 S.E.2d 183 (W. Va. 1980).
"7 Id. at 191.
13 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
119 (Cur. Supp. 1980).
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substantial liberty interest, differs from the United States Su-
preme Court, which distinguishes between the deprivation "of a
liberty that one has, as in parole, and being denied a conditional
liberty that one desires. '1 40
In State ex rel. J.R. v. MacQueen,141 the West Virginia su-
preme court held that all the constitutional protections afforded
an adult in parole revocation proceedings must also be afforded
juveniles. The court also recognized that the standard of proof
required for revocation of parole for adults requires that the pa-
role board be satisfied that a condition has been violated, 142
whereas a juvenile will not have his parole revoked unless there is
a finding of clear and convincing proof of substantial violation of
parole.143 The doctrine of parens patriae, which denied some pro-
cedural protections to juveniles, has been replaced by "surplus"
due process protection in this area. A juvenile now has far greater
due process protection in a parole revocation hearing than does
an adult.
C. Miscellaneous Cases
State ex rel. Faircloth v. Catlett,14" overrules in part Conley
v. Dingess1 45 Conley held that West Virginia Code § 62-1C-
1(b) 46 prohibited the granting of post-conviction bail for persons
convicted of armed robbery, inasmuch as they were subject to life
imprisonment.1 47 Armed robbery is a crime for which there may
be a determinate sentence,24 and imposition of a determinate
sentence of ten years or more is within the trial courts' discre-
tion.149 The problem in determining whether a defendant is eligi-
ble for bail arises over the construction of the phrase "punishable
140 Greenholty v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 9 (1979).
141 259 S.E.2d 420, 423 (W. Va. 1980).
141 W. VA. CoDE § 62-12-19 (1977 Replacement Vol.) (emphasis added).
143 W. VA. CODE § 49-5-14 (Cum. Supp. 1980) (emphasis added).
144 267 S.E.2d 736 (W. Va. 1980).
345 250 S.E.2d 136 (W. Va. 1978).
146 (1977 Replacement Vol.). This section provides in part that "[b]ail may be
allowed pending appeal from a conviction for an offense not punishable by death
or life imprisonment."
14 W. VA. CODE § 61-2-12 (1977 Replacement Vol.).
148 State ex reL. Vascovich v. Skeen, 138 W. Va. 417, 424, 76 S.E.2d 283
(1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 916 (1953).
"' See note 146 supra.
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by ... life imprisonment." A majority of the supreme court felt
that, since'an armed robber could be punished by a term of life
iniprisonment or a determinate sentence for less, it would be un-
wise to deem armed robbery a crime "punishable by ... life im-
prisonment" within the meaning of the statute so as to deprive a
person sentenced to less than life imprisonment of the chance for
bail pending appeal.
In a sharply worded dissent, Justice Caplan, joined by Chief
Justice Neely, criticizes the majority for "legislating in a manner
directly contrary to clear statutory language." 150 The majority,
however, based its decision on three considerations: "[t]he struc-
tural differences in the statutory language setting punishment for
crimes that are punishable by confinement for life, and the armed
robbery statute,' 5' the rule of strict statutory construction of
criminal statutes and the remedial purpose of the bail statute.1
52
: In State v. Olish,'5 3 the court held that where the defendant
wishes to withdraw a guilty plea made voluntarily and with full
knowledge of his rights before sentence is imposed, he is generally
allowed that right if he can show any fair and just reason. The
defendant in this case had pled guilty to first degree murder after
the prosecutor agreed to remain neutral on the question of mercy,
but the presentence report contained statements made by the
prosecutor in apparent violation of the agreement. The defen-
dant, rather than seeking to enforce the plea bargain agreement,
chose to withdraw his guilty plea.
The West Virginia court has established as a general rule
that once a guilty plea is entered and sentence imposed, it will
not be set aside.'" Only where refusal to set aside the plea will
result in manifest injustice will the court consider allowing the
withdrawal to be made.'5 ' In this situation, however, the parties
will be placed in their original position if the plea is withdrawn.
150 267 S.E.2d at 738.
151 Id. at 737.
52 See State ex rel. Hutzler v. Dostert, 236 S.E.2d 336 (W. Va. 1977), where
W. VA. CODE § 62-1C-1 (1977 Replacement Vol.) was interpreted as allowing post-
conviction bail.
Ia3 266 S.E.2d 134 (W. Va. 1980).
154 State ex rel. Burton v. Whyte, 256 S.E.2d 424 (W. Va. 1979).
185 Potter v. Mohn, 256 S.E.2d 763 (W. Va. 1979); State v. Stevenson, 67 W.
Va. 553, 68 S.E. 286 (1910).
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Sentence has not been imposed and neither side gains an advan-
tage. It is only equitable to allow the defendant to withdraw his
plea where he detrimentally relies on the representations of the
prosecutor and has been misled, whether intentionally or not. If,
however, the state will suffer substantial prejudice if the guilty
plea is withdrawn prior to sentence, this is a factor the court
should balance in determining whether the plea should be with-
drawn. The question raised by this case need never have become
an issue if the plea bargain had been disclosed at the time the
initial guilty plea was entered. The court would have determined
its validity and made sure that its terms were followed. 56
The defendant in State v. Vance'57 was convicted of breaking
and entering and was subsequently sentenced under the Habitual
Criminal Act.'5 On appeal, one ground alleged as error was that
the conviction was based on testimony of accomplices and he was
denied the usual cautionary instructions as to their testimony.
Generally, a criminal conviction may be obtained on the uncor-
roborated testimony of an accomplice.' 59 Where the testimony of
the accomplice is uncorroborated, however, the defendant is enti-
tled to a cautionary instruction to the jury, as an accomplice may
well have a motive for testifying against the defendant other than
the search for truth.6 0 The problem is in determining the degree
of corroboration necessary to preclude the use of the cautionary
instruction. No West Virginia cases to date have analyzed this
particular question, so the court adopted the Virginia rule that
"[w]here ... the testimony of an accomplice is corroborated in
material facts which tend to connect the accused with the crime,
sufficient to warrant the jury in crediting the truth of the accom-
plice's testimony, it is not error to refuse a cautionary instruc-
tion."" The West Virginia court further advised that where
there is doubt, the instruction should be given.
156 See Call v. McKenzie, 220 S.E.2d 665 (W. Va. 1975); State ex rel. Clancy
v. Coiner, 154 W. Va. 857, 179 S.E.2d 726 (1971).
157 262 S.E.2d 423 (W. Va. 1980).
" W. VA. CODE § 61-11-18 (1977 Replacement Vol.).
18 State v. Messinger, 256 S.E.2d 587 (W. Va. 1979).
160 State v. Spadafore, 220 S.E.2d 655 (W. Va. 1975).
' Dillard v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 820, 823, 224 S.E.2d 137, 140 (1976).
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The issue in State ex rel. Rowe v. Ferguson"62 was whether,
under West Virginia law, criminal defendants have a right to a
post-indictment preliminary hearing. The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals held that the accused does not have a right to a
preliminary hearing if he has been already indicted by a grand
jury.
After finding nothing in the West Virginia Constitution that
would give an independent constitutional right to a preliminary
hearing,163 the court turned to the defendant's argument that
West Virginia Code § 62-1-82" should be construed as requiring a
preliminary hearing for any offense that is to be presented to a
grand jury. The pertinent part of the statute reads, "[i]f the of-
fense is to be presented for indictment, the preliminary examina-
tion shall be conducted... within a reasonable time after the
defendant is arrested, unless the defendant waives examina-
tion."" 5 The court first noted that this section of the code "is
part of a larger criminal procedure article" and, therefore, related
sections must be read in pari materia.11"
The court concluded that two basic principles are implied
from the conditional statement, "if the offense is to be presented
for indictment, the preliminary hearing shall be conducted
.... First, not all offenses need be presented for indictment,
and second, the right to a preliminary hearing depends upon the
happening of a future event, presentation to a grand jury. If the
offense will be presented to a grand jury, a preliminary hearing
must be held because the defendant is "in custody" and no deter-
mination of probable cause has yet been made. But if the state
indicts without a preliminary hearing or before one can be held,
the preliminary hearing is not required, as probable cause has
been determined to exist by the return of the indictment. To hold
a preliminary hearing for another probable cause determination
1:2 268 S.E.2d 45 (W. Va. 1980).
63 Id. at 47. Most other state courts agree with this conclusion. See cases
cited in 268 S.E.2d at 47.
1 (1977 Replacement Vol.).
168 Id.
:" 268 S.E.2d at 48.
'67 W. VA. CODE § 62-1-8 (1977 Replacement Vol.).
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would be superfluous.
Another function of the preliminary hearing has been discov-
ery. In West Virginia, discovery is liberally accorded once a de-
fendant has been indicted,168 therefore a post-indictment prelimi-
nary hearing is an unnecessary waste of resources. Since the two
primary reasons for holding a preliminary hearing are rendered
moot by the return of an indictment, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals held in Rowe that a preliminary hearing is not
necessary in these circumstances.
State ex rel. Arbogast v. Mohn169 involved the application of
the West Virginia general savings statute 7 0 to the amendment of
a penal law. The defendants in Arbogast were indicted for grand
larceny at a time when that crime was defined as the taking of
goods worth fifty dollars or more. However, before they were con-
victed and sentenced to the state penitentiary, the statute defin-
ing grand and petit larceny was amended by the legislature to
include as grand larceny only the taking of goods worth two
hundred dollars or more.171 Subsequent to their convictions, the
defendants filed habeas corpus petitions contesting the legality of
their confinement in the penitentiary on the basis that the
amendment changed the character of their offenses from felonies
to misdemeanors.
The supreme court of appeals rejected the defendant's argu-
ment that the amendment affected the character of the offense.
The defendants, therefore, retained their status as convicted
felons. However, reasoning that the amendment expressed the
legislature's intent that from the effective date of the amendment
the taking of goods worth less than two hundred dollars should be
punished as a misdemeanor, the court held that the amendment
268 S.E.2d at 50, citing State v. Sette, 242 S.E.2d 464 (W. Va. 1978).
260 S.E.2d 820 (W. Va. 1979).
170 W. VA. CODE § 2-2-8 (1979 Replacement Vol.) provides:
The repeal of a law ... shall not affect any offense committed, or
penalty or punishment incurred, before the repeal took effect ... and
that if any penalty or punishment be mitigated by the new law, such
new law may, with the consent of the party affected thereby, be applied
to any judgment pronounced after it has taken effect.
171 W. VA. CODE § 61-3-13 (Cum. Supp. 1980). The defendants were convicted
for the taking of goods worth more than $50 but less than $200.
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did have the effect of mitigating the former statute's penalties.17 2
Since the general savings statute provides for the application of
mitigated penalties upon the election of the affected party, the
court found that the defendants should have been entitled to
choose under which statute they desired to be sentenced.
In addition to establishing the right of a defendant to elect
the amended statute to be applied for sentencing purposes, the
court also found that the requirements of due process place upon
the trial court, as well as the defendant's counsel, the duty to in-
form the defendant of his right to election.173 In so doing the
court overruled State v. McClung 74 insofar as it held that there
was no duty on the part of the court to inform the defendant of
his right to elect. Since there was no record in the instant case of
whether the defendants had been informed of their right to elect,
the court remanded for further proceedings.
In State v. Vollmer175 the issue raised was whether the state,
in charging an offense arising out of an automobile accident, must
proceed under the West Virginia negligent homicide statute,176 or
whether it may charge the defendant with involuntary man-
slaughter. The defendant had argued, inter alia, that only the
negligent homicide statute should apply because the statutory
crime contains different elements of proof than the crime of in-
voluntary manslaughter. The foundation of this argument rests
upon the notion that negligent homicide requires a showing of
"reckless disregard of the safety of others, ' 177 while involuntary
17 The court recognized that it could be argued that the amendment did not
actually mitigate the penalties imposed by the former statute, but only redefined
the offenses of petit and grand larceny, and provided alternative penalties to be
applied at the discretion of the sentencing court. However, the court felt, in light
of the legislature's determination that the imposition of an indeterminate sentence
in the penitentiary was too harsh a penalty for the taking of goods worth less than
$200, that "the net effect of the amendment was indeed, to mitigate the penalties
imposed" under the former statute. 260 S.E.2d at 824 (emphasis by the court).
I's The Arbogast court did not reach the issue of whether the failure of the
defendant's counsel to inform him of his right to elect constituted ineffective as-
sistance of counsel. However, the court suggests that, standing alone, it probably
does not
174 116 W. Va. 591, 182 S.E. 865 (1935).
178 259 S.E.2d 836 (W. Va. 1979).
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manslaughter requires only a showing that the defendant was
"engaged in an unlawful act or the performance of a lawful act in
an unlawful manner. 17 8 Thus, according to the defendant's argu-
ment, if the state were allowed to charge him with involuntary
manslaughter he could be convicted upon a showing of simple
negligence despite the negligent homicide statute's requirement
of a showing of reckless conduct. The court rejected this argu-
ment. Relying on State v. Lough,17 9 it found that an "unlawful
act" for purposes of involuntary manslaughter contemplates only
acts which are malum in se, not acts which are merely malum
prohibitum.1 80 Consequently more than simple negligence or the
violation of a traffic ordinance is required to sustain a charge of
involuntary manslaughter. Since the standard of proof required
by a charge of involuntary manslaughter is compatible with that
set out in the negligent homicide statute, the state may charge
the defendant with either crime.
In State ex rel. Farley v. Wharton,181 the West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals declared unconstitutional West Virginia
Code § 61-3A-3 2 as it creates an unconstitutional presumption
of intent, which is a material element of the crime of shoplifting.
The court has previously held, in a number of situations, that
any statute which supplies an element of a crime is unconstitu-
tional because such statutes remove from the state the burden of
proving every material element of a crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.1 83 Here, each of the definitions of shoplifting contained in
West Virginia Code § 61-3A-118' requires proof of an intention to
convert. However, "§ 61-3A-3 makes the act of concealment
prima facie evidence that there was an intention to convert."' 8 5 If
the statute is allowed to stand, the crime changes from that of
178 State v. Lough, 143 W. Va. 838, 105 S.E.2d 538 (1958).
179 Id.
18' "An offense malum in se is properly defined as one which is naturally evil,
as adjudged by the sense of a civilized community. An act which is malum prohib-
itum is wrong only because made so by statute." 40 AM. JuR. 2d Homicide § 77
(1968).
161 267 S.E.2d 754 (W. Va. 1980).
131 (1977 Replacement Vol.).
18 See State v. Ball, 264 S.E.2d 844 (W. Va. 1980); State v. Pendry, 227
S.E.2d 210 (W. Va. 1976).
18 (1977 Replacement Vol.).
1- 267 S.E.2d at 755 (emphasis in original).
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concealment with the intent to convert, to simply concealment;2e6
this the court found untenable. Farley is thus another link in a
chain of cases which hold that any statute which supplies a mate-




156 Id. at 755.
181 See cases cited at note 193 supra.
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DOMESTIC RELATIONS
I. ALIMONY
The West Virginia Code provides for a divorce on the
grounds of irreconcilable differences without requiring an allega-
tion of fault in the complaint.1 However, since "fault" has tradi-
tionally been the basis for justifying alimony, the question arose
in the recent case of Haynes v. Haynes2 whether alimony could
be granted in those instances where no fault was proved.
The plaintiff (wife) in Haynes filed for a divorce charging
adultery, mental cruelty, and irreconcilable differences. The trial
court found both parties "equally entitled to the divorce because
of irreconcilable differences and denied any alimony award." In
reaching its conclusion the lower court relied on the supreme
court decision in Dyer v. Tsapis.4
In Dyer the court held that in divorce cases where alimony
had not been fixed by agreement, the courts must take a number
of factors into consideration when making an alimony award so
"as to strike a balance among all the competing equities." The
divorce .in Dyer was based on a voluntary separation under a
West Virginia Code section which seems to require a finding of
fault before an award of alimony may be made.6 Given this statu-
1 W. VA. CODE § 48-2-4(a)(10) (Cum. Supp. 1980) provides:
If one party to a marriage shall file a verified complaint, for divorce,
against the other, alleging that irreconcilable differences have arisen be-
tween the parties ... and if the defendant shall file a verified answer to
the complaint and admit or aver that irreconcilable differences exist be-
tween the parties the court may grant a divorce.... The court may
make such order for alimony... as may be just and equitable ....
2 264 S.E.2d 474 (W. Va. 1980).
3 Id. at 475.
4 249 S.E.2d 509 (W. Va. 1978).
5 Id. at 513.
6 W. VA. CODE § 48-2-4(a)(7) (Cum. Supp. 1980) provides that a divorce may
be ordered:
Where the parties have lived separate and apart in separate places of
abode without any cohabitation and without interruption for one year,
whether such separation was the voluntary act of one of the parties or
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tory mandate the court obviously considered fault a major factor
to be considered in the alimony decision; at least, in the voluntary
separation context.
The trial court read the Dyer decision broadly and assumed
that a finding of fault was a prerequisite to making a "just and
equitable" award of alimony as required by the statute allowing,
divorces based on irreconcilable differences.
On appeal, the appellant asserted that she had the right to
alimony without a showing of fault. The supreme court agreed
with this interpretation of the statute reasoning that fault was
only one of many factors which determine what is "just and equi-
table." The court noted that a divorce based on irreconcilable dif-
ferences was "strictly consensual." A divorce is not granted on
irreconcilable difference grounds unless in response to a com-
plaint alleging those differences the other "party files an answer
admitting those differences."
The court believed that this procedure, requiring an "admis-
sion" or "consent," indicated that "the Legislature intended to
eliminate fault as an absolute condition precedent to an alimony.
award" in divorces based on irreconcilable differences.9
The court in distinguishing its holding in Dyer stated that
the crucial difference between the voluntary separation statute
involved in Dyer and the irreconcilable differences statute in-
volved in Haynes was that the latter statute was consensual.10
When the divorce is consensual "alimony may be awarded with-
out the same finding of inequitable conduct which would be re-
quired in a non-consensual context."'
The court has stated that in making a determination of
alimony, whatever the ground for, the divorce, the trial judge
by the mutual consent of the parties;. ... If alimony is sought,.. . the
court may inquire into the question of who is the party at fault and may
award such alimony according to the right of the matter ....
The court in Dyer said "fault" when used in the context of the above section
meazot "inequitable conduct." 249 S.E.2d at 512.
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"should look to all the possible factors and tailor his decree in
such a way as to strike a balance among all the competing equi-
ties."'2 In view of the decision in Haynes the element of fault will
have to be weighted differently in this balance depending on
whether the divorce is characterized as consensual or non-
consensual.
Il. PATERNITY SUITS
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recently con-
fronted two cases dealing with the due process rights of defen-
dants in paternity suits. In State ex rel. Graves v. Daugherty,"
the court was concerned with the indigent defendant's right to
court-appointed counsel; while in State ex rel. Gue v. Dunbar,'4
the court dealt with the indigent's right to state-paid blood tests.
In Daugherty, the trial court refused to appoint counsel on
the ground that "a paternity suit is in the nature of a civil pro-
ceeding,' 5 and, therefore, due process considerations do not
apply.
The mere classification of an action as "civil," however, does
not end the due process inquiry under the supreme court's recent
interpretations of the West Virginia Constitution. The court has
recognized that due process requires the appointment of counsel
by the court "in criminal and civil actions which may constrain
one's liberty or involve important personal rights." 6 For instance,
the court has required the appointment of counsel in civil mental
health commitment hearings,' 7 civil and criminal contempt pro-
ceedings,' 8 hearings regarding violation of municipal ordinances,' 9
child neglect proceedings,"0 and juvenile proceedings. 2
The court in its review of the lower court's decision in
Is Id. (quoting Dyer v. Tsapis, 249 S.E.2d at 513).
13 266 S.E.2d 142 (W. Va. 1980).
14 Id.
"Id.
Id. at 144 (emphasis added).
7 State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 157 W.Va. 417, 202 S.E.2d 109 (1974).
Is Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Doe, 220 S.E.2d 672 (W. Va. 1975).
19 Bullett v. Staggs, 250 S.E.2d 38 (W. Va. 1978).
0 State ex rel. Lemaster v. Oakley, 157 W. Va. 590, 203 S.E.2d 140 (1974).
" Wilson v. Bambrick, 156 W. Va. 703, 195 S.E.2d 721 (1973).
[Vol. 83
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Daugherty quickly rejected the lower court's simplistic resolution
of the case and focused its attention on the "characteristics and
ramifications" of the paternity proceeding.22 The court noted that
a paternity defendant is arrested, brought before a magistrate, re-
quired to post bond, and prosecuted by the state. More impor-
tantly, however, the fixing of paternity upon the defendant can
affect "his liberty, his estate, and his earnings. ' '23
The court concluded that the indigent defendant in a pater-
nity suit was entitled to due process protection in the form of
appointed counsel because of the potential significant impact of a
paternity determination on his liberty and property. The court's
decision reinforces its position that "the characteristics and
ramifications of a proceeding, rather than its label spawn due pro-
cess requirements. '24
In the other paternity case, State ex rel. Gue v. Dunbar, the
trial court refused an indigent defendant's motion requesting
blood grouping tests to be performed and paid for by the state.
The West Virginia Code provides that where a defendant is being
charged with fathering an illegitimate child, he is entitled to re-
quire blood tests to be made of the mother, her child, and himself
for the sole purpose of proving he is not the father of the child.
Although the trial court would have permitted the blood tests, it
held that the defendant would have to pay for them.
The defendant in Gue appealed this decision claiming that
his rights under the due process and equal protection clauses of
the United States and West Virginia constitutions had been vio-
lated. The West Virginia Court agreed holding that blood group-
ing tests in this case were expenses that should be borne by the
State. The court stated that:
Because of the criminal elements attached to paternity pro-
ceedings, because blood tests are an important part of the de-
fense against allegations of paternity, because the language of
our statute is mandatory, and because the defendant's ability
to pay for the blood test bears no rational relationship to his
guilt or innocence, a defendant is entitled to administration of
22 266 S.E.2d at 144.
23 Id. at 145, quoting State ex rel. Wright v. Bennett, 90 W.Va. 477, 480, 111
S.E. 146, 147 (1922).
24 266 S.E.2d at 144.
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the tests even though he is unable to pay the required costs."
The cases of Daugherty and Gue give the indigent defendant
the right to court-appointed counsel and free blood tests. Failure
of the state to provide either will constitute reversible error.
III. CHILD CUSTODY
The West Virginia Code provides for a change in custody of
children after a court decree awarding a divorce, if the person
seeking custody change files a petition with the court for a hear-
ing.26 In practice, this is usually done by writ of habeas corpus.
While the party whose rights will be affected must be given rea-
sonable notice of the hearing, personal service of process upon
that party is not required. It has been stated that such notice
could be made "in any manner in which service of process in a
civil suit or action may be had." 27 For instance, in Harloe v.
Harloe,28 the court referred to the notice required in such a pro-
ceeding and stated, "notice need not necessarily be personal ser-
vice but it must be notice of some character provided by law, ei-
ther by delivery of a copy to a member of his family over sixteen
years of age, or posting, or by publication. 29 In Acord v. Acord,30
the West Virginia court held that mailing a notice to a party's
attorney of record was insufficient notice of the proceeding, thus
rendering the order of the court void.
IV. CONTEMPT
In domestic relations litigation, alimony,31 counsel fees,82 suit
money, 3 support,3 and maintenance" may be enforced by civil
contempt proceedings. As a result, the defendant held in con-
" 266 S.E.2d at 146.
26 W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
. Harloe v. Harloe, 129 W. Va. 1, 38 S.E.2d 362 (1946).
'Id.
' Id. at 5, 38 S.E.2d at 364.
"264 S.E.2d 848 (W. Va. 1980).
Ex parte Beavers, 80 W. Va. 34, 91 S.E. 1076 (1917).
" Miller v. Baer, 114 W. Va. 566, 172 S.E. 612 (1934).
" Id.
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tempt faces the possibility of imprisonment.36 Initial considera-
tions underlying imprisonment for civil contempt in domestic re-
lation matters include: "What conduct may result in this harsh
remedy?"; and, "What procedures must be utilized to protect the
rights of the accused before imprisonment is ordered?" Two re-
cent West Virginia cases provide new guidance for trial courts in
these matters.
In State ex rel. Canada v. Hatfield,3 7 the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals limited the remedy of imprisonment
for failure to pay child support to those situations where the de-
fendant is contumacious. The trial court in Canada ordered the
defendant to be imprisoned "until he has purged himself of con-
tempt or until further order of the court.'" The defendant was
found to be over $3,000 in arrears in child support payments. The
nonpayment of the child support, however, was a result of the
defendant's unemployment. The record contained no evidence
that the defendant had acted in a contumacious manner. The ap-
pellate court held that "[iun the absence of proof of a contuma-
cious attitude, the trial court abused its discretion by finding the
relator in contempt and ordering his imprisonment."3 This appli-
cation of the contumacious standard of contempt for failure to
pay child support extends State ex rel. Varner v. Janco.40 In that
case, the court required evidence of contumacious behavior before
one could be imprisoned for arrearages in alimony payments.
Therefore, before a defendant can be jailed for failing to pay child
support or alimony, a finding of contumacious behavior must be
evidenced and reflected in the record. The mere lack of payment
is insufficient to justify confinement of the defendant.
In Hendershot v. Hendershot,41 the court recognized the
right to a jury trial in a contempt proceeding where a jail sen-
tence is imposed and the defendant is given no opportunity for
3' Smith v. Smith, 81 W. Va. 761, 95 S.E. 199 (1918).
3, 258 S.E.2d 440 (W. Va. 1979).
" Id. at 441.
3, Id. See May v. Dupont, 43 Del Ch. 334, 229 A.2d 784 (1967) (the court
distinguishes between the usage of contumacious in the legal sense and in a dic-
tionary sense. The former means wilful disobedience to a judicial order; the latter
means stubbornly perverse or rebellious, contrary, factious, or intractable).
40 156 W.Va. 139, 191 S.E.2d 504 (1972).
4 263 S.E.2d 90 (1980).
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immediate release by purging himself. In Hendershot, the appel-
lant was held in contempt and imprisoned for conspiring with his
son to remove his grandson from the state, thus violating a di-
vorce court order requiring the son to relinquish custody of the
child. The trial court refused the appellant's request for a jury
trial.
The majority of the court in Hendershot42 ruled that con-
tempt will be deemed criminal when the court order includes im-
prisonment and there is no opportunity for the contemnor to gain
immediate release by doing an act within his power. The Hender-
shot rule does not apply in situations where the sentencing order
allows for immediate release if the defendant performs an act rea-
so:nably within his power, nor does it prevent the court from sum-
marily expelling a disruptive person from the courtroom. 48 The
criminal designation is heavily dependent on the nature of the
punishment infficted.44 These latter situations do not carry sanc-
tions sufficient to cross the rather indistinct line between civil
and criminal contempt.
The majority in Hendershot based the right to a jury trial in
a contempt proceeding deemed criminal on article III, section 14
of the West Virginia Constitution. The court felt that since the
fo nation of the state, the framers of the constitution, the legisla-
ture and the court itself have been unanimous in the belief that
the right to a jury trial is accorded in criminal actions where the
penalty imposed involves any period of incarceration. This is a
greater right than that afforded under the United States
Constitution.45
Thomas H. Fluharty
42 Chief Justice Neely filed a dissent.
43 263 S.E.2d at 97.
" Id. at 93.
41 Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
[Vol. 83
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ELECTIONS
West Virginia Libertarian Party v. Manchin1 is a challenge
by third political parties2 and an independent candidate of the
constitutionality of several West Virginia election statutes.3
1 270 S.E.2d 634 (W. Va. 1980), appeal dismissed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3213 (Oct. 7,
1980). The petitioners in this case include: The West Virginia Libertarian Party;
1980 West Virginia Socialist Workers Campaign Committees; Tom Moriarity,
Socialist Workers candidate for governor, and John B. Anderson, independent
candidate for president, as intervenor.
2 Third parties include any party other than Democratic and Republican.
3 The text of W. VA. CODE, § 3-5-8(a) (1979 Replacement Vol.) states:
A candidate for president of the United States, for vice-president of the
United States, for United States senator, for member of the United
States house of representatives, for governor and for all other state
elective offices shall pay a fee equivalent to one percent of the annual
salary of the office for which the candidate announces... . (emphasis
added).
The material portion of W. VA. CODE § 3-5-23(b) (1979 Replacement Vol.)
provides:
The person or persons soliciting or canvassing signatures of duly
qualified votes on such certificate or certificates, shall be residents and
qualified, registered voters, of the magisterial district of the county in
which such solicitation or canvassing is made, and may solicit or canvass
duly registered voters resident within their own respective magisterial
district ....
The relevant part of W. VA. CODE § 3-5-23(c) (1979 Replacement Vol.) states:
The certificate shall be personally signed by duly registered voters...
who must be residents within the magisterial district of the county
wherein such canvass or solicitation is made by the person or persons
duly authorized.. . . No person signing such certificate shall vote at any
primary election to be held to nominate candidates for office to be voted
for at the election to be held next after the date of signing such
certificate....
W. VA. CODE § 3-5-24 (1979 Replacement Vol.) states:
All certificates nominating candidates for office under the preceding
section [§ 3-5-23], including a candidate for the office of presidential
elector, shall be filed, in the case of a candidate to be voted for by the
voters of the entire State or by any subdivision thereof other than a
single county, with the secretary of state, and in the case of all
candidates for county and magisterial district offices, including all offices
to be filled by the voters of a single county, with the clerk of the circuit
court of the county, not later than the day preceding the date on which
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Petitioners brought an original mandamus proceeding because of
the need for expedition posed by deadlines for filing fees and
submitting third party signature petitions before the June 3, 1980
primaly election. The court issued its order on May 22, 1980 and
the full opinion was filed on September 16, 1980.
Petitioners contend that West Virginia Code § 3-5-8(a),,
which requires filing fees, is in violation of the equal protection
clauses of the state and federal Constitutions5 as it denies ballot
access to impecunious candidates. Secondly, they assert West
Virginia Code § 3-5-236 denies an independent candidate the
fundamental right of access to the ballot.' The third allegation
relates to the requirement that a person soliciting signatures for
nominating petitions must reside in the same magisterial district
as the persons he solicits. The remaining challenges relate to the
requirement that a person soliciting signatures have a credentials
certificate; the disqualification of persons signing a nominating
petition from voting in the primary election, and the requirement
that nominating petitions be submitted the day before the
primmy election. Petitioners contend these restrictions, either
separately or in combined effect, are an undue burden on ballot
access.
West Virginia Code requires a candidate to submit a filing
fee of one percent of the annual salary of the office for which he
wishes to run.$ This fee must be paid prior to obtaining petition
signatures necessary for nomination of third party candidates.
Two United States Supreme Court cases, Lubin v. Panish9 and
Bullock v. Carter,0 have addressed this issue and both concluded
the primary election is held. After such date no such certificate shall be
received by such officers.
' (1979 Replacement Vol.). See note 10 infra.
5 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 17.
£ (1979 Replacement Vol.). See note 10 infra.
7 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has recognized that the right
to run for office is a fundamental right. State ex. rel. Bromelow v. Daniel, 258
S.E.2d 119 (W. Va. 1979); Marra V. Zink, 256 S.E.2d 581 (W. Va. 1979); State ex.
rel. Piccirillo v. City of Follansbee, 233 S.E.2d 419 (W. Va. 1977); State ex. rel.
Maloney v. McCartney, 223 S.E.2d 607 (W. Va. 1976); Brewer v. Wilson, 151 W.
Va. 113, 150 S.E.2d 592 (1966).
* W. VA. CODE § 3-5-8 (1979 Replacement Vol.).
' 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
10 4-05 U.S. 134 (1972).
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that "a state could not condition ballot access solely upon the
payment of a filing fee." '11 Those decisions make it clear that
some alternative to filing fees such as voter signature petitions
must be available to impecunious candidates. The West Virginia
court declared the statutory filing fees unconstitutional as to such
candidates.1"
The second assignment of error involves intervenor, John B.
Anderson, and his assertion that West Virginia Code § 3-5-23,'3
which precludes an independent candidate from obtaining
petition signatures so he may be placed on the ballot, is
unconstitutional. On this point the court relies on Storer v.
Brown 4 in which the United States Supreme Court announced
"[W]e perceive no sufficient state interest in conditioning ballot
position for an independent candidate on his forming a new
political party as long as the state is free to assure itself that the
candidate is a serious contender, truly independent, and with a
satisfactory level of community support."' 5 The West Virginia
court therefore holds that § 8-5-23 violated the United States and
West Virginia Constitutions' equal protection clauses by failing to
provide the same ballot access to independent candidates as it
does to political party candidates.
The third issue on appeal tests the constitutionality of the
restriction in West Virginia Code § 3-5-23(b) and (c)"6 requiring
that a person soliciting signatures for a candidate only solicit
signatures from persons residing within the magisterial district in
which he or she lives. The West Virginia court relies on Moore v.
Ogilvie17 to invalidate the magisterial district restriction on voter
signature canvassing. In finding an equal protection violation, the
West Virginia court stated that (1) the restriction discriminates
" 270 S.E.2d at 639.
12 Id.
,1 (1979 Replacement Vol.).
14 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
15 Id. at 746. The Court, in Storer, upheld a California statute which
disqualifies a person from running as an independent candidate if he or she has
been a member of a political party within 12 months prior to the primary election
in which he or she seeks to run. The Court also suggests at page 740 that
gathering 13,542 signatures per day for 24 days, which is five percent of the voter
turnout at the last election, is not an undue burden.
" (1979 Replacement Vol.).
394 U.S. 814 (1969).
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against candidates who represent geographically concentrated
constituents, (2) inhibits the geographic mobility of canvassers,
(3) hampers the candidate by a fragmented signature drive and
increased costs, since he is compelled to recruit solicitors for each
magisterial district, and (4) causes invalid signatures on the
petition because neither the voter nor the solicitor may know the
magisterial district boundary lines. 18
The court concludes that the magisterial district restriction
cannot be justified by a compelling state interest under the equal
protection clauses of the state and federal Constitutions.19 The
credentials requirement forces potential canvassers of signature
petitions to be certified by a clerk of the county court pursuant to
West Virginia Code § 3-5-23(b).20 The court upholds this
requirement in stating "the credentials requirement. . serves a
substantial state interest in assuring the integrity of the signature
solicitation process.""1 The court concludes that the requirement
imposes no unconstitutional burden on independent or third-
party candidates.
This conclusion appears to be contrary to the magisterial
district section in that the state need only show a substantial
state interest to justify the restriction while the former section
required a showing of a compelling state interest. It is not
apparent from the discussion in the case why the credentials
requirement deserves a different test from the magisterial district
residence restriction.
The fifth and sixth issues addressed by the court are the
prohibition of persons signing petitions from voting in the
primary election as mandated by West Virginia Code § 3-5-23(c) 22
and the requirement that the candidate file signature petitions by
the day preceding the primary election set forth in West Virginia
Code § 3-5-24.23 The court suggests that the equal protection test
in this section is "whether the state has imposed a significantly
higher burden on the independent or third-party candidate than
" 270 S.E.2d at 640-42.
" Id. at 642.
(1979 Replacement Vol.).
2, 270 S.E.2d at 643.
1 (1979 Replacement Vol.).
21 (1979 Replacement Vol.).
[Vol. 83
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it has imposed on major-party candidates." '2'
The court once again relies heavily on United States
Supreme Court cases" and decides that sections 3-5-24 and 3-5-
23(c) do not impose an unreasonable burden on third-party and
independent candidates in gaining access to the ballot for the
general election. The court found section 3-5-24 to be reasonable
in light of the filing deadline for regular party candidates and the
length of time a third-party or independent candidate has to
procure signature petitions.26 The court also held section 3-5-
23(c) reasonable because it merely prevents a person from
participating twice in the primary election process.27
Libertarian Party v. Manchin makes significant progress in
the area of ballot access for third-party and independent
candidates. 28 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
followed the United States Supreme Court cases very closely in
making its interpretation of the West Virginia Equal Protection
Clause. In some respects, Libertarian Party appears to have
departed from the equal protection, compelling state interest test
formerly used in West Virginia "right to run for office" cases. The
decisions of Libertarian Party v. Manchin, Marra v. Zink and
State ex. rel. Piccirillo v. City of Follansbee in this area give the
impression that different tests will be applied to restrictions on a
"regular party candidate" and to limits on a third-party or
independent candidate.
Mark D. Clark
24 270 S.E.2d at 644. The West Virginia court relies on Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23 (1968) as support for this "significantly higher burden" test.
21 American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Storer v. Brown,
415 U.S. 724 (1974); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 152 (1973); Jenness v.
Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
' 270 S.E.2d at 646.
27 Id. at 647.
28 See generally Elder, Access to the Ballot by Political Candidates, 83 DICK.
L. REV. 387 (1979); Note, Nominating Petition Requirements for Third-Party and
Independent Candidate Ballot Access, 11 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 974 (1977);
Developments in the Law - Elections, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1111 (1975); Kester,
Constitutional Restrictions on Political Parties, 60 VA. L. REv. 735 (1974); Note,
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EVIDENCE
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Blamble v.
Harsh' held that the "best evidence" rule should not be used to
preclude a jury's resoldition of conflicting documentary evidence.
According to the best evidence rule the best evidence
available should be produced when proving a matter in issue.
Only in situations where primary evidence cannot be obtained
should secondary evidence be admissable.2
In Blamble, a landowner, as plaintiff, sought a declaratory
judgement determining the rights of three parties in a seven-
tenths-mile long section of road. The landowner claimed the
section to be a private rather than a public road. A West Virginia
Department of Highways engineer testified that the road did not
appear on the 1934 official highway map, and it was his district's
position that the road was private.3
A witness who had been personally involved in the process of
transferring county roads to the State in 1933 testified for the
defendants, adjacent landowners. The witness produced a "scroll"
obtained from the state department of highways upon which the
county roads were schematically represented. He identified a line
on the scroll as the disputed road and concluded from the scroll
that the road had been a county road which should have been
transferred to the state. The road's absence from the 1934 official
highway map was attributed to a draftsman's error by this
witness.'
The defendants argued that the scrolls constituted the "best
evidence" to identify the road as a public one. The trial court,
however, held that the best evidence rule was not applicable to
the factual situation in this case, since it ordinarily applies to
require the production of a written document and to forbid the
260 S.E.2d 273 (W. Va. 1979).
F. CLECKLEY, HANDBOOK ON EVIDENCE FOR WEST VIRGINIA LAWYERS, § 67, at
436 (1979); 7 MIcHIE'S JURISPRUDENCE, Evidence § 116 (1976).
3 260 S.E.2d, at 274-75.
4 Id. at 275.
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consideration of parol evidence. Therefore, the jury was
permitted to weigh the conflicting documentary evidence and to
resolve the issue.3
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's decision in
holding the best evidence rule inapplicable. e This affirmation
demonstrates the court's reluctance to allow the best evidence
rule to be loosely applied to conflicting documentary evidence.
The court took the position that the rule will ordinarily only
apply to preclude oral testimony where documentary evidence
exists and to preclude the use of copies when the original
document is available.7 Thus, the best evidence rule only excludes
evidence which shows in itself that there is a more superior source
of evidence available.8 When there are two conflicting documents
and the court cannot ascertain which is the original, a jury should
resolve the issue.
Louis F. Williams, Jr.
Id.
.Id.
Id., see, e.g., Marson Coal Co., Inc. v. Ins. Co. of State of Pennsylvania, 210
S.E.2d 747 (W.Va. 1974); Montgomery v. Fay, 139 W. Va. 273, 80 S.E.2d 103
(1954); State v. Fowery, 137 W. Va. 883, 74 S.E.2d 772 (1953); F. CLECILEY,
HANDBOOK ON EVIDENCE FOR WEST VIRGINIA LAWYERS, § 67, at 436 (1979).
Professor Cleckley stated the following about the "best evidence" rule in his
Handbook:
Where proof is to be made of some fact which is recorded in writing,
West Virginia is committed to the best evidence rule, which requires the
production of the written document and which forbids the consideration
of parol evidence, unless the failure to produce the document itself is
properly accounted for.
8 S. GARD, JONES ON EVIDENCE CIVL AND CRIMINAL § 7:1, at 87 (6th ed. 1972).
9 260 S.E.2d at 275; Long v. City of Weirton, 214 S.E.2d 832 (W.Va. 1975);
Morgan v. Price, 151 W.Va. 158, 150 S.E.2d 897 (1966).
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PROCEDURE
I. AMENDMENTS TO THE PLEADING
The case of Roberts v. Wagner Chevrolet-Olds, Inc.1 involved
a certified question to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals dealing with whether an amendment to the pleadings stat-
ing a new theory of law, but which arose from the same set of
facts as involved in the original complaint, would relate back to
the original for the purposes of the statute of limitations.
The case stemmed from a dispute arising after the defendant,
Wagner, had repaired the plaintiffs' automobile. When the plain-
tiffs went to get their car they were informed that the exact costs
had not been computed as of that time. To save time they were
asked to sign a blank note which would be filled in when actual
costs were computed. They agreed but were upset when they real-
ized the repair cost was substantially more than the original esti-
mate. They expressed their displeasure to the Old National Bank,
which had taken possession of the note by assignment, but later
attempted to pay their indebtedness. The bank refused their pay-
ment and subsequently seized the plaintiffs' car.
The plaintiffs then filed suit, alleging the unconscionability
of the foreclosed note and, therefore, the unlawful conversion of
their property. More than a year after the filing of the original
complaint the plaintiffs amended their pleading to assert a new
theory of law based on the Truth in Lending Act.2 Built into this
Act is a one year limitation for bringing the action from the date
of the violation.3 Obviously, then, if the amendment did not re-
late back, the plaintiffs could not state a cause of action under
the Act. The trial court certified the issue to the supreme court
for adjudication.
The court held that the amendment did relate back aid was
not barred by the one year limitation. In doing so, the court effec-
tively adopts the federal "same transaction" analysis of when
258 S.E.2d 901 (W. Va. 1979).
15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1968).
15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1968).
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amendments relate back. This test generally provides that an
amendment (even if it states a new theory of law) arising out of
the same transaction or occurrence giving rise to the original com-
plaint will relate back to the original complaint.4 This is opposed
to the "cause of action" test adopted at common law which per-
mitted an amendment to relate back as long as it did not alter the
cause of action asserted in the original complaint. Under this
analysis if the amended pleading altered the theory of the case,
for example, from tort to contract, then the amendment did not
relate back even if the facts alleged in the two complaints were
identical.' Thus, at common law a new legitimate claim could be
defeated by a statute of limitations, though there would have
been no prejudice to the defendant if the claim had been permit-
ted. This is unduly harsh and was a prime consideration in the
promulgation of Rule 15(c).
Given that West Virginia's Rule 15(c) is identical to Rule
15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with the exception
of a clause relating to service of process on the Attorney General
in the federal rule, there would be strong reason for the court to
accept the interpretation expressed in the overwhelming number
of federal decisions addressing the subject.6 In addition, the West
Virginia court in the past has recognized the precedential value of
federal decisions interpreting Rule 15(c). 7 Two noted authors in-
terpreting the West Virginia rule give essentially the same inter-
pretation as the court in Roberts.8
Finally, the court's holding is not inconsistent with the pur-
pose behind statutes of limitation in general. Basically, the ratio-
nale for having a statute of limitations is to avoid the introduc-
tion of stale evidence. This protects the defendant who cannot
adequately prepare a defense because evidence favorable to him
4 3 MooRE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 15.1513]; 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1496 (1971) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT &
MILLER].
5 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1497 at 499, citing Shipman, COMMON LAW PLEADING
§ 163, at 296 (3d ed. 1923).
6 See, e.g., Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 323 U.S. 574 (1945); United
States v. Johnson, 288 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1961); Nola Elec. Co. v. Reilly, 93 F.
Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
7 Plum v. Mitter, 204 S.E.2d 8 (W. Va. 1974).
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has been lost or destroyed during the time elapsed since the cause
of action accrued.' This concern is effectively upheld by the court
by predicating the same transaction test with the limitations that
the "[r]elation back should not occur where (1) allowance of rela-
tion back would work injustice on any party or (2) the opposing
party had no notice of the new cause, and, by allowing relation
back, he would have no opportunity to prepare a defense to it."10
These limitations are not required by the express wording of
the rule, yet as the court points out it is not inconsistent with
interpretations placed on Rule 15(c) by the federal decisions."
II. ATTORNEY WITHDRAWAL
In Cardot o. LufP2 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals establishes the procedural guidelines for when an attorney
may withdraw from a case. The case was before the court via a
writ of prohibition filed by the petitioners when the lower court
denied their motion to withdraw.
The petitioners were originally retained to represent certain
defendants in two civil suits pending in the circuit court.
Problems arose when the parties represented refused to advance
the petitioners money for certain expenses which had accrued as
a result of the pending litigation and failed to respond to phone
calls and letters from the petitioners. At the pre-trial conference
which the petitioners failed to attend because of their attempted
withdrawal, their motion to withdraw was overruled. The peti-
tioners then filed the writ of prohibition. 8
While the case before the court was not one of first impres-
sion," it did involve an issue which had not received any exten-
sive treatment; the case therefore permitted elaboration on an is-
sue which will probably be of import to every attorney at some
point in his practice.
The court provides three basic criteria for when an attorney
See 51 AM. Jur. 2d Limitations of Actions § 17 (1970).
10 258 S.E.2d at 903-04.
11 See, e.g., Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 574 (1945); Zagur-
ski v. American Tobacco Co., 44 F.R.D. 440 (D.C. Conn. 1967).
12 262 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1980).
13 262 S.E.2d at 890-91.
"I See Matheny v. Farley, 66 W. Va. 680, 66 S.E. 1060 (1910).
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may withdraw. First and probably foremost, the attorney in a
civil suit15 is justified in withdrawing only upon demonstration of
good cause.18 What constitutes good cause is not addressed by the
court in Cardot; however, it is clear that failure by the client to
provide necessary fees is sufficient good cause to justify
withdrawal.17
Demonstration of good cause does not provide the attorney
with an absolute right to withdraw. In addition, the attorney
must also provide his client with reasonable notice of his inten-
tion to withdraw. s Finally, the court requires the attorney seek-
ing withdrawal in a pending suit to obtain the permission of the
particular court involved. 1'
Applying these principles to the present case, the court found
that even though approval by a court for withdrawal should
rarely be withheld,20 in this instance the trial court acted properly
in denying the petitioners' motion. While recognizing that the pe-
titioners had ample cause for terminating the relationship, the
court held that the petitioners did not adequately provide their
clients with reasonable notice. The petitioners in their correspon-
dences alluded to their intentions to withdraw, but they never ex-
pressed a definite statement of intention to do so, nor the exact
time when the appropriate motion would be made before the cir-
cuit court.21
One thing in the Cardot decision that seems difficult to un-
derstand is the court's rather strict application of the notice re-
quirement. In the present case the petitioners' clients probably
did have knowledge that the petitioners wished to withdraw. Any
15 Criminal cases are treated somewhat differently. The rule is generally more
restrictive. See, e.g., Watson v. Black, 239 S.E.2d 664 (W. Va. 1977); Young v.
Young, 212 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1975).
16 Stark County v. Mischel, 42 N.D. 332, 173 N.W. 817, 6 A.L.R. 174 (1919);
2A MICHIE'S JURISPRUDENCE Attorney and Client § 16 (1969).
17 262 S.E.2d at 893. See Matheny v. Farley, 66 W. Va. 680, 684, 66 S.E. 1060,
1061 (1910).
18 262 S.E.2d at 893.
19 Id. at 892. See Fisher v. State, 248 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1971); Fairchild v. Gen-
eral Motors Acceptance Corp., 254 Miss. 261, 179 So. 2d 185 (1965); See also Code
of Professional Responsibility, W. VA. CODE, Appendix DR 2-110(A)(1) (1978 Re-
placement Vol.).
20 262 S.E.2d at 893. See Fisher v. State, 248 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1971).
21 262 S.E.2d at 894.
1980]
71
et al.: Survey of Developments in West Virginia Law: 1980
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1980
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
prejudice suffered by the parties could have been cured by the
mere granting of a continuance. In the last sentence of the opin-
ion the court states, "Today's finding does not preclude relators
on further proper notice from renewing the motion to withdraw
as counsel. ' 22 It appears in light of the court's decision in Cardot
that attorneys must provide specific notice to their clients of their
intention to withdraw and the exact time and date when they will
so move in the appropriate court.
Another case dealing with the attorney's right to withdraw is
May v. Siebert.28 In this case the attorney had negotiated a set-
tlement which his clients rejected. The clients then expressed a
loss in confidence in the attorney. Consequently, the attorney
withdrew with the lower court's approval. He then filed suit for
the value of his services. The case presented the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals with the opportunity to expand on the
principles discussed in Cardot.
The court found that mere failure by the client to accept a
negotiated settlement and the client's expression of lack of confi-
dence in the attorney are not sufficient causes to justify with-
drawal.24 This forced the court to examine the rights to compen-
sation for an attorney who has withdrawn without good cause.
There are some jurisdictions which deny the attorney's right to
any compensation when withdrawal is unjustified.25 The court
found this to be unduly harsh, however, and held that "[i]f a law-
yer withdraws without good cause, but follows the procedure out-
lined in Cardot . . . and there is no resultant prejudice to the
client, the attorney should be permitted to show the court the
benefits which his work conferred on the client. '26 Thus, the at-
torney may be compensated for benefits conferred on the client,
but not to a greater extent than the pro-rata share of the fee
based on the time spent on the case relative to the time spent by
the attorney retained by the client after the withdrawal. The cli-
ent should not be forced to pay a double fee as a result of an
22 Id.
23 264 S.E.2d 643 (W. Va. 1980).
24 Id. at 646. See Annot., 88 A.L.R.3d 246, 267 (1978). But see Matararrese v.
Wilson, 202 Misc. 994, 118 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1952).
U See 7A C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 110 (1980); S. SPEiSER, ATTORNEYS'
IFEs § 4:10 at 157 (1973). See also Annot., 88 A.L.R.3d 246, 250-54 (1978).
26 264 S.E.2d at 647.
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attorney's unjustified withdrawal. 7 The court sought to protect
the rights of the abandoned client without providing him with a
windfall.
III. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
In the case of Trail v. Hawley"8 the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals addressed the issue of "[w]hether the heirs of a
deceased may bring a declaratory judgment action to determine if
the deceased's personal representative is prosecuting a wrongful
death action in consonance with her fiduciary duty to the heirs."29
The case arose as a result of a disagreement between the
heirs and the executrix as to the handling of a particular wrongful
death action of which the petitioners/heirs would be the ultimate
distributees of any award or settlement. The petitioners hired a
Beckley law firm to represent their interests in the wrongful
death action. The respondent refused to cooperate with the firm
and retained instead the services of her nephew, an attorney from
outside the State of West Virginia. The respondent claimed that
since pursuant to statute3 0 she was the only party who could
bring the action, she was the ultimate authority with regard to
the handling of the suit. The petitioners filed a declaratory judg-
ment action s' to adjudicate the issue. The trial court dismissed
the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted and the petitioners appealed.
The supreme court in Trail held that the circumstances of
the case were such as to warrant an adjudication of the issues via
a declaratory judgment.32 In examining the issues involved the
27 Id.
28 259 S.E.2d 423 (W. Va. 1979).
29 Id. at 424.
30 See W. VA. Con. § 55-7-6 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
-1 The petitioners sought judgment on the following questions:
1) [W]hether the petitioners or the respondent have the right to employ
an attorney to prosecute the wrongful death action; 2) whether the peti-
tioners or the respondent have the right to control the negotiations of
this claim and/or a settlement of the same; and 3) whether the petition-
ers have the right to file through their attorney a wrongful death action
in respondent's name as executrix. 259 S.E.2d at 424.
2 For a declaratory judgment to be proper there need exist a justiciable con-
troversy between the parties. "[A] justiciable controversy exists when a legal right
is claimed by one party and denied by another." Id. at 425, citing Robertson v.
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court agrees that a wrongful death action may only be brought by
the personal representative of the decedent's estate;"3 however,
this does not vest the personal representative with absolute con-
trol over the suit. The personal representative serves as a fiduci-
ary to the ultimate distributees of the estate and has a duty to act
in their best interests. Accordingly, the ultimate distributees have
a legal right to see that the duty owed them by the personal rep-
resentative is not violated. The court found the ability to bring a
declaratory judgment action to adjudicate the propriety of a per-
sonal representative's actions concerning the wrongful death ac-
tion to be an appropriate and necessary safeguard of that right."'
In support of its decision the court cites the lack of alterna-
tive remedies available to the heirs under the circumstances of
the present case. Should the heirs deem the award of settlement
to be insufficient, their only real recourse would be to sue the per-
sonal representative or the attorney.3 5 This would entail the addi-
tional time, expense and uncertainty of another trial in which the
heirs would effectively have to re-try the wrongful death action to
demonstrate the negligence of the attorney retained by the per-
sonal representative. As Justice Neely recognizes in the opinion it
is far better to nip the affair in the bud than to let it run its
course to the possible unjust enrichment of the personal represen-
tative or her appointees.3 8
In addition, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act 37 clearly
provides that a person interested as or through a fiduciary in the
administration of an estate is entitled to a declaration with regard
to directing the executors, administrators or trustees to do or ab-
stain from doing any particular act in their fiduciary duty., This
could apply to the manner in which the fiduciary handles a
wrongful death action for the ultimate benefit of the heirs of the
Hatcher, 148 W. Va. 239, 135 S.E.2d 675 (1964).
" Id. at 425. See Silvious v. Helmick, 291 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. W. Va. 1968).
" Id. The court cites Thompson v. Mann, 65 W. Va. 648, 64 S.E. 920 (1909),
for the proposition that the personal representative serves as a trustee for the
heirs. See Dunsmore v. Hartman, 140 W. Va. 357, 84 S.E.2d 137 (1954).
35 Id. The meagerness of a verdict alone in a wrongful death action is not
sufficient reason to have the verdict set aside. See Kesner v. Trenton, 216 S.E.2d
880 (W. Va. 1975); Legg v. Jones, 126 W. Va. 757, 30 S.E.2d 76 (1944).
- 296 S.E.2d at 426.
3, W. VA. CODE § 55-13-1 (1966).
" W. VA. CODE § 55-13-4 (1966).
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Further credence is lended to the holding in Trail by an ex-
amination of the traditional reasons for declaratory judgments.
Generally, declaratory judgments serve to eliminate possible
problems before they develop into actual controversies; thereby
saving the parties both time and money.39
IV. WRIT OF PROHIBITON
The case of Hinkle v. Black40 arose out of the "Willow Island
disaster," a construction accident, which resulted in the deaths of
fifty-one men. In Pleasants County, site of the disaster, there
were as of June 18, 1979, twenty wrongful death actions pending
with regard to that disaster. These were all consolidated by the
Pleasants County Circuit Court for the purposes of discovery.
The circuit court also ruled that all future cases related to the
incident filed in Pleasants County would also be consolidated.
In addition to these cases, seven similar suits were filed in
Wood County. These cases, upon motion of a common defendant,
were removed to Pleasants County and consolidated with the
suits originally fied there. The plaintiffs in the Wood County
suits filed a writ of prohibition with the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals alleging that the lower court had exceeded its
powers in transferring the seven cases.
The court seized the opportunity provided by this case to
prescribe some general guidelines for "when a litigant can suc-
cessfully seek a writ of prohibition to serve the office of an inter-
locutory appeal.' 1 The court set forth the two basic criteria to be
used in determining whether the writ of prohibition should issue.
First, the adequacy of other remedies available to the litigant
should be considered.4' For example, if an appeal after judgment
is a viable remedy the court will normally not issue the writ. The
3, See Note, Statutory Remedies: The Declaratory Judgment in West Vir-
ginia, 73 W. VA. L. R.v. 165 (1971). See, e.g., West Virginjia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v.
Strong, 129 W. Va. 832, 42 S.E.2d 46 (1947).
40 262 S.E.2d 744 (W. Va. 1980).
41 Id. at 746.
4" Normally, if there are other remedies available the writ will not be issued.
63 AM. JuL 2d Prohibition § 8 (1972). But see, Cunard Steamship Co. v. Hudson,
93 W. Va. 209, 116 S.E. 511 (1923).
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second criteria is the "economy of effort among litigants, lawyers
and courts."4
As a supplement to or a refinement of the two basic criteria,
the court discussed other factors affecting the decision of whether
to issue the writ. One important consideration was whether the
motion involved a clear-cut legal issue or questions of fact." The
court recognized that appellate courts are not generally effective
finders of fact and, therefore, they should avoid ruling on issues
better suited for adjudication at the trial court level. Another fac-
tor is the certainty that the case will be completely reversed if the
alleged errors are not corrected in advance. 5 In all instances, the
court should examine the good faith nature of the application. If
a petition is brought before the court merely as a device to "de-
lay, confuse, or confound '"' the workings of the trial court, the
petition will be denied.
The court in Hinkle then applied the prescribed criteria to
the facts of the case before it. The court recognized that the case
was such that a writ of prohibition could properly issue, there be-
ing no other adequate remedy available to the plaintiffs; however,
the court denied the writ on its merits. The court held that the
lower court's actions were taken pursuant to a valid statute.47
Furthermore, the court found Pleasants County as convenient a
forum as Wood County for the plaintiffs; the transfer of these
cases did not result in any significant increase in expense or
aggravation.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the Hinkle case is not
the actual holding, but rather its potential impact on the use of
writs of prohibition in general. While Justice Neely adamantly as-
43 262 S.E.2d at 748.
" This distinction has been recognized in the past by the West Virginia
court. See, e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Rogers, 52 W. Va. 450, 44 S.E. 300
(1903). See also Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 247, 270-72 (1963).
" The court gives various examples of errors of this type. Examples given are
"proceedings predicated on unconstitutional statutes; improper joinder of parties
defendant; awards of alimony in favor of a guilty party against whom a divorce
has been granted; proceedings in direct contravention of a clear, positive com-
mand of the State or Federal constitutions; proceedings in contravention of a
clear, positive command of a statute." 262 S.E.2d at 750.
,1 262 S.E.2d at 748.
17 W. VA. CODE § 56-9-1 (1966).
[Vol. 83
76
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 10
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol83/iss2/10
SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENTS
serts that the opinion is not intended to expand the scope of the
writ of prohibition, 8 the tone of the opinion seems to suggest the
opposite. The decision's tenor suggests that a writ of prohibition
will no longer be viewed as a remedy issued only for extraordinary
cause. Rather, the court seems to invite petitions for such writs
whenever the criteria prescribed in Hinkle are arguably met, and
encourages the interruption of suits on the trial level.
This is the aspect of the opinion which Justice Caplan finds
objectionable in his concurrence. He agrees with the result in
Hinkle, but disagrees with the "tenor of the opinion. ' 49 He states
that:
It is my firm conviction that the pronouncements in the opin-
ion in relation to the function of the writ of prohibition are far
too broad, that they obliterate the distinction between that ex-
traordinary remedy and appeal and that the use of prohibition
in the manner prescribed will cause confusion and delay in the
trial of cases.50
Perhaps Justice Caplan's fears have been alleviated by the
court's subsequent opinion in the case of State ex rel. Williams v.
Narick.5 1 While, on its face, the case is consistent with the princi-
ples of Hinkle, the tone of the case seems more restrictive with
regard to the use of the writ of prohibition and more in keeping
with earlier cases. The court seems to place a great deal of em-
phasis on the need for an "obvious" jurisdictional defect before a
writ will issue. For example, the court cited Woodall v. Laurita52
for the proposition that "[iln absence of jurisdictional defect, the
administration of justice is not well served by challenges to dis-
cretionary rulings of an interlocutory nature."53 With regard to
petitions involving alleged abuse of authority by the lower court,
the court in Williams indicated that only when abuse is "so
flagrant and violative of petitioner's rights as to make a remedy
:8 262 S.E.2d at 750.
9 Id. at 752 (Caplan, J., concurring).
:0 Id.
81 264 S.E.2d 851 (W. Va. 1980).
52 156 W. Va. 707, 195 S.E.2d 717 (1973). In this case Justice Neely writing
for the majority took what seems to be a more restrictive view of a writ of prohibi-
tion than he expressed in Hinkle. See 262 S.E.2d at 752 (Caplan, J., concurring).
53 264 S.E.2d at 854. See State v. Milam, 260 S.E.2d 295 (W. Va. 1979); State
ex rel. Peaches v. Sencindiver, 233 S.E.2d 425 (W. Va. 1977).
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by appeal inadequate will a writ of prohibition issue."'
Viewing the tone of the Williams case, it is arguable that the
-court's view of the writ of prohibition has not changed signifi-
cantly and that whatever Hinkle may have implied by its tone is
not the actual position taken by the court. It appears that the
present position of the court is to discourage writs of prohibition,
except in the extraordinary situations in which they have tradi-
tionally been granted.
Randal A. Minor
" 264 S.E.2d at 854-55 (emphasis added) (quoting Woodall v. Laurita, 156 W.
Va. 707, 195 S.E.2d 717 (1973)).
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PROPERTY
I. ESTATES AND TRUSTS
In Berry v. Union National Bank1 the West Virginia court
was confronted with a collision of two conflicting principles of
law: the strong presumption against intestacy 2 and the remorse-
less application of the Rule Against Perpetuities. 3 By adopting
the doctrine of equitable modification the court compromised the
two principles in a manner whereby the testator's intent is given
effect without total destruction of the Rule Against Perpetuities.
The equitable modification doctrine made applicable to non-
charitable trusts in Berry is very similar to the cy pres doctrine
enacted by the West Virginia Legislature in 1931.' The latter pro-
vides an escape from the Rule Against Perpetuities as applied to
charitable trusts. The action is also in accord with a national
trend away from strict application of the rule.5
262 S.E.2d 766 (W. Va. 1980).
2 See, e.g., Rastle v. Gamsjager, 151 W. Va. 499, 153 S.E.2d 403 (1967); Cow-
herd v. Fleming, 84 W. Va. 227, 100 S.E. 84 (1919).
'The Rule Against Perpetuities requires that every executory limitation in
order to be valid shall be so limited that it must necessarily vest, if at all, within a
life or lives in being, ten months and twenty-one years thereafter, the period of
gestation being allowed only where it is a factor. First Huntington Nat'l Bank v.
Gideon-Broh Realty Co., 139 W. Va. 130, 79 S.E.2d 675 (1953); Brookover v.
Grimm, 118 W. Va. 227, 190 S.E. 697 (1937).
4 W. VA. CODE § 35-2-2 (1966).
5 At present eighteen states have either statutorily or judicially reformed the
application of the Rule Against Perpetuities by adopting the cy pres doctrine, al-
ternatively called equitable reformation or equitable approximation.
Statutory reforms: California-CAL. Civ. CODE § 715.5 (Supp. 1979) (West);
Connecticut-CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-96 (Supp. 1979) (West); Florida-FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 689.22(4) (Supp. 1979) (West); Idaho-IDAHo CODE, § 55-111 (Supp.
1979); Illinois-ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 194(c) (2) (Supp. 1979) (Smith-Hurd);
Kentucky-13 Ky. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 381.216 (1972) (Baldwin); Maine-Ms. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 102 (1978); Maryland-MD. EsT. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-
103(b) (1974); Massachusetts-MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 184A, § 2 (Supp. 1977)
(West); Missouri-Mo. ANN. STAT. § 442.555(2) (Supp. 1979) (Vernon); New
York-N.Y. EsT., PowERs & TRUsTS LAw § 9-1.2 (Supp. 1967) (McKinney);
Ohio-OHiO REv. CODE ANN. § 2131.08(C) (Supp. 1976) (Page); Oklahoma-OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §§ 75-78 (Supp. 1979) (West); Texas-TEx. Civ. CODE ANN. tit.
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Although the door is now open to modification of trusts
which violate the rule, the court still professes support of the un-
derlying policies of the Rule Against Perpetuities and will deny
validity to an interest which must vest beyond the time limita-
tions provided in the rule. To determine whether a non-charita-
ble devise or bequest which violates the rule can be equitably
modified, the court devised the following test:
(1) The testator's intent is expressed in the instrument or
can be readily determined by a court;
(2) The testator's general intent does not violate the Rule
Against Perpetuities;
(3) The testator's particular intent, which does violate the
rule, is not a critical aspect of the testamentary scheme; and
(4) The proposed modification will effectuate the testa-
tor's general intent, will avoid the consequences of intestacy,
and will conform to the policy considerations underlying the
rule.
7
The questioned will in Berry expressed a general intention to
provide funds for the education of certain family members and a
particular intention that the trust was to continue for twenty-five
years. The general intention does not violate the common law
rule, but the specific intention violates the rule by four years.There is no indication that the four-year overrun is a critical as-
pect of the testamentary scheme. The new doctrine allows the
trust to be modified to run twenty-one years and thereby give ef-
fect to the testator's general intent, avoid intestacy, and still con-
form to the underlying considerations of the rule.
Mason v. Masons marks the third time that a will containing
questionably conditional language has reached the West Virginia
court for interpretation, and each time questionable language has
been held to create an absolute will.'
1291b, § 2 (Supp. 1978) (Vernon); Vermont-VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501 (1975
Rep. Ed.).
Judicial reforms: Hawaii-In Re Estate of Chun Quan Yee Hop, 52 Hawaii
40, 469 P.2d 183 (1970); Mississippi-Carter v. Berry, 243 Miss. 321, 140 So. 2d
843 (1962); New Hampshire-Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 31 A. 900 (1891).
6 262 S.E.2d at 771.
7 Id.
& 268 S.E.2d 67 (W. Va. 1980).
1 Questionable language previously held to create an absolute will was: "If
enything [sic] happens to us on this trip that we shouldn't return, I want my
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The holographic will in question began, "Nov 4th 1973 - I
am in the hospital for surgery, and in case I do not survive. Ev-
erything I have belongs to Mervin."10 The testator survived sur-
gery and died January 6, 1976, of an unrelated illness. Although
no party questioned the will's validity, the circuit court held the
language created a conditional will and declared the deceased to
be intestate.
The majority of wills which contain questionably conditional
language are written immediately prior to surgery or at a time of
serious illness.1 The decisions indicate that there are no technical
words which will always determine the writer's intent, nor is there
uniformity in the holdings.1 2 Thus, to determine if the maker in-
tended the will to be absolute-in which case the conditional
words are considered to be the motivation for making a will-or
whether the words created a condition precedent, the court is
forced to consider both the text and the surrounding facts and
circumstances.
There is strong authority that courts prefer finding a will ab-
solute.13 Considering the circumstances under which the will was
written and the fact that Mrs. Mason kept it for more than three
years after her recovery, the court felt justified in avoiding the
creation of intestacy. In ruling the will to be absolute, the court
stated the language in question was indicative of why Mrs. Mason
made a will and did not establish conditions for its activation. As
is evidenced by the court's method in arriving at this decision, the
property and all my interest in the property to be... "National Bank of Com-
merce v. Wehrle, 124 W. Va. 268, 274, 20 S.E.2d 112, 115 (1942); and, "if I get
drowned this morning, March 7, 1872, that I bequeath all my property ..
French v. French, 14 W. Va. 458, 462 (1877).
10 268 S.E.2d at 68.
1 Wills made in anticipation of surgery were held absolute in re Cook, 173
Cal. 465, 160 P. 553 (1916); and in re Dowling's Estate, 16 Pa. D. & C. 381 (1932);
and held contingent in Walker v. Hibbard, 185 Ky. 795, 215 S.W. 800 (1919).
12 See, e.g., Robnett v. Ashlock, 49 Mo. 171 (1872), "I this day start to Ken-
tucky; I may never get back; if it should be my misfortune, I give my property to
my sister's children," (conditional); as compared with Ferguson v. Ferguson, 121
Tex. 119, 45 S.W.2d 1096 (1931), "I am going on a journey, and I may never come
back alive, so I make this will. . . " (absolute).
13 Eaton v. Brown, 193 U.S. 411 (1904); In re Desmond's Estate, 223 Cal.
App. 2d 211, 35 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1963); National Bank of Commerce v. Wehrle, 124
W. Va. 268, 20 S.E.2d 112 (1942).
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area of conditional language in wills is still without guidelines and
uniformity. Decisions will continue to be made on a case by case
approach, with the court's presumption of testacy bearing heavy
weight.
In Loar v. Massey14 the West Virginia court was asked to
rule on an appeal from a consent decree which established a trust
and to determine whether the language of a will which created a
life estate could be coupled with a grant of powers of disposal to
create a fee simple absolute.
No objection or reservation was raised when the lower court
issued the consent decree which construed the will in question to
have created a trust.15 The court followed a consistent line of au-
thority in ruling that by consenting to the decree the appellant
had effectively waived any issue arising therefrom,16 even if the
decree was in fact erroneous.
The appellant's second assertion was that the will granted
her fee simple ownership, premised on the theory that a life es-
tate coupled with a general power to consume expressed an intent
on the part of the testator to create a fee simple. Appellant
reached this conclusion from the following: "I give, divise and be-
queath to Ruth Ann Welsh [sic] for her lifetime only, all my per-
sonal property ... and the right to Miss Welsh [sic] to consume
as much thereof as may be necessary to keep her in health
181
The archaic theory of property law which once allowed this
coupling of interests has long been overruled in a vast majority of
jurisdictions19 and was specifically abrogated by the West Vir-
ginia legislature in 1931.20 Further, the power of disposal granted
14 261 S.E.2d 83 (W. Va. 1979).
15 Id. at 85.
16 Hunter v. Kennedy, 20 W. Va. 343 (1882); Rose & Co. v. Brown, 17 W. Va.
649 (1881); Monion v. Fahy, 11 W. Va. 482 (1877).
17 Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S, 311 (1928); Herbert C. Heller & Co.
v. Duncan, 110 W. Va. 628, 159 S.E. 52 (1931).
18 261 S.E.2d at 87.
11 E.g., Mead v. Welch, 95 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1938); In re Smyth's Estate, 132
Cal. App. 2d 343, 282 P.2d 141 (1955); Rogers v. Rogers, 221 S.C. 360, 70 S.E.2d
637 (1952); Swan v. Pople, 118 W. Va. 538, 190 S.E. 902 (1937).
20 W. VA. CoDE § 36-1-16 (1966). This statute provides that an interest in real
property given by will with a limitation over and a power of disposal creates an
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here was of limited nature, as evidenced by the testator's words,
"to use so much as may be necessary to keep her in health." The
statute has been construed as providing that a life tenant with
unlimited powers of use and disposal takes less than a fee sim-
ple.2 1 In cases where the language of a will is clear, as it is here,
any other grant to the devisee would only serve to contravene the
intention of the testator.
The appellant also alleged that "to keep her in health" were
not restrictive words which would limit her power to invade the
trust until such time as she was destitute. The lower court de-
fined this phrase to include expenses for food, clothing, medicine,
doctor's services, and hospital care." As was noted by the court,
there is no other case in West Virginia or elsewhere which defines
"to keep her in health"; thus, the lower court's interpretation
stands as a valid construction of the testator's intent.
II. CoAL, O., AND GAS
In Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin, 2 3 a lessee of coal underlying
a surface estate attempted to erect power transmission lines on
the surface to serve a ventilation system for the lessee's under-
ground mining operations. The deed through which the lessee had
obtained mining rights contained no express right to erect power
transmission lines on the surface estate." The lessee enjoined the
surface owner from interfering with the project. From this injunc-
tion the surface owner appealed.
Buffalo Mining posed to the court the issue of whether the
right to erect power transmission lines on the surface estate was a
right implied in the 1890 severance deed from which the lessee's
interest derived. Although the court partially resolved the issue
by relying on the customary rule that permissible surface uses by
a mineral grantee are those reasonably necessary to extract the
minerals,'5 it also adopted a type of balancing test, based on the
estate subject to such limitation over unless the power of disposal has been law-
fully exercised.
21 In re Estate of Evans, 156 W. Va. 425, 194 S.E.2d 379 (1973).
2 261 S.E.2d at 88.
" 267 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1980).
24 Id. at 722.
,5 Adkins v. United Fuel Gas Co., 134 W. Va. 719, 61 S.E.2d 633 (1950);
Squires v. Lafferty, 95 W. Va. 307, 121 S.E. 90 (1924); Porter v. Mack Mfg. Co., 65
19801
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court's re-examination of past cases."8
The surface owner argued that the court had in the past re-
fused to imply the right to surface mine in a severance deed be-
cause that mining method was not technologically feasible nor
contemplated by the parties at the time the deed was made.2 7 By
analogy, the surface owner reasoned that since stringing power
transmission lines over land was neither technologically available
nor contemplated by the parties to the severance deed, there was
no implied right to erect power transmission lines on the surface
estate.
The Buffalo Mining court redefined the rationale of past
cases involving the implied right to surface mine, reasoning that
the unforeseen and uncontemplated nature of the alleged right to
surface mine was not the real reason the right was denied. Rather,
the court stated that "the fundamental basis . . . for the deci-
sions is whether the use sought was substantially compatible with
the surface rights granted to the mineral owner and whether it
substantially burdens the surface owner's estate.
28
Under Buffalo Mining, the party seeking to establish an im-
plied surface use must show that it is reasonably necessary to ex-
tract the minerals and not overly burdensome to the rights of the
surface owner.2 9 The court's previous interpretation of its "tech-
nological advancement" cases on implied mining rights would al-
low a proposed use to be denied for the sole reason that it was not
intended by the parties to the severance deed, without regard to
the degree of harm to the surface owner's rights.80 The court
abandoned this interpretation, feeling that whatever might be lost
in sacrificing the parties' putative intentions is offset by the prac-
ticality of permitting efficient and relatively harmless new im-
W. Va. 636, 64 S.E. 853. (1909).
26 Brown v. Crozer Coal and Land Co., 144 W. Va. 296, 107 S.E.2d 777 (1959);
Oresta v. Romano Bros., Inc., 137 W. Va. 633, 73 S.E.2d 622 (1952); West Virginia-
Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Strong, 129 W. Va. 832, 42 S.E.2d 46 (1947).
27 See cases cited supra note 4.
267 S.E.2d 721, 724 n.3.
29 Id. at 725.
30 In a dissent by Justice Harshbarger (McGraw, J., concurring), the majority
is taken to task for ignoring the intentions of the parties to the severance deed
and is warned that such disregard opens the door for the court to fashion con-
tracts without regard to what the parties wanted. 267 S.E.2d at 726.
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The court also indicated its receptiveness to a common-sense
argument that links the likelihood of finding a particular use an
implied right to the broadness of the set of corresponding express
rights: the broader the express rights in a severance deed, the eas-
ier for the court to find a correlative implied right."' In this same
connection, the court failed to invalidate statements in a prior
case to the effect that express mining rights in a severance deed
negate implied mining rights.3 2 The court acknowledged this prin-
ciple and stated only that it did not control in the present case.
This suggests the court's affirmation of the principle's continuing
validity. Persuasive authority exists, however, to support a rule of
law that express mining rights do not negate implied mining
rights.33
In determining implied surface uses by a mineral grantee, ad
hoc examination of the burden to the surface owner is now the
measure, not strict adherence to the rights intended by the par-
ties to a severance deed made many years ago. The case strikes a
balance; it endeavors to protect the rights of surface owners while
allowing for technological advances in the extraction of minerals.
III. SUBDMSION CONTROL
Singer v. Davenport" presented the court with an opportu-
nity to develop the law of subdivision control in West Virginia. In
this case, the Jefferson County Planning Commission denied a
subdivision developer's application for approval of a plat, relying
on a broad subdivision control statute which described general
guidelines to be used in determining whether to approve a plat.35
In trial court, the developers sought and won an order compelling
3, 267 S.E.2d at 725.
32 West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Strong, 129 W. Va. 832, 836, 42
S.E.2d 46, 49 (1947).
33 Cole v. Ross Coal Co., 150 F. Supp. 808 (S.D. W. Va. 1957). In Cole, the
court held that "expressed mining rights are in addition to, and not in substitu-
tion for, the implied mining rights which the law gives the owner of coal." 150 F.
Supp. at 816. See Donley, Coal Mining Rights and Privileges in West Virginia, 52
W. VA. L. REV. 32, 39 (1950).
34 264 S.E.2d 637 (W. Va. 1980).
35 W. VA. CODE § 8-24-30 (1976 Replacement VoL).
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approval of the plat."'
On appeal, the commission argued that its decision to reject
the plat was proper because the plat was incompatible with the
commission's comprehensive plan;' 7 and that it possessed statu-
tory authority to disapprove plats."
The court ruled that the comprehensive plan was not vio-
lated,3' but found that, in any event, such plans do not have the
force of law and serve only as a foundation for zoning ordi-
nances,40 none of which had ever been passed by the Jefferson
County electorate.4 The commission's statutory authority argu-
ment was also rejected and it is the court's analysis on this point
that is of significance.42
The court found that the broad language of West Virginia
Code § 8-24-30, 43 on which authority was based, to be an insuffi-
cient measure for planning commissions to use in rejecting subdi-
vision plats. The broad language allowed the commission too
much discretion in rejecting subdivision plats" and created an at-
mosphere in which highly subjective and arbitrary decisions could
be made.4 The ambiguity of the statute failed to supply develop-
ers with the specificity that would enable them to "know in ad-
vance what is required of them and what standards and proce-
dures will apply.' 46 The commission's use of West Virginia Code
§ 8-24-30 as a measure of disapproval of subdivision plats effec-
tively allowed it to accomplish zoning through vague or non-exis-
tent subdivision planning regulations. Zoning is a function clearly
beyond the commission's legal capacity.'2 Thus, in order to be
3, 264 S.E.2d at 639.
37 W. VA. CODE § 8-24-16 (1976 Replacement Vol.). A comprehensive plan
provides a base for the future use and development of property in a jurisdictional
area. See 1 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 12.03 (1979).
31 See note 13 supra.
31 264 S.E.2d at 640.
4* Id. See 1 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 37, at § 12.02.
41 264 S.E.2d at 640.
41 Id. at 642.
41 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
4 264 S.E.2d at 642.
4" See 3 R. ANDERsON, AMEcAN LAW OF ZONING § 23.19 (2d ed. 1977 & Supp.
1980).
44 264 S.E.2d at 642.
. Zoning relates to whether property can be used for a particular purpose
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within its authority in deciding on a plat application, a planning
commission must act pursuant to specific and standardized subdi-
vision regulations 48 which have the effect of expanding upon
vague statutory guidelines. The reasons the statutory authority
was found insufficient are the same reasons the specific subdivi-
sion regulations were found necessary.
Singer is a signal to planning commissions that standardless
decision-making in subdivision development will not be tolerated.
The case brought West Virginia into line with what is recognized
as the desirable practice of refining broad statutory guidelines
through the adoption of particularized subdivision regulations.49
IV. EASEMENTS
In Mays v. Hogue,50 the court was confronted with two issues
relating to the law of easements. The first issue was whether a
right of way51 over a servient estate was an easement appurtenant
to the dominant estate or an easement in gross. Secondly, the
court was asked whether and to what extent the owner of a domi-
nant estate was obligated to maintain a road over the right of
way.
Citing West Virginia precedent,52 the court employed tradi-
tional criteria to decide whether the right of way in question was
appurtenant to the land or in gross.58 To be appurtenant to the
land the right of way must by nature be a useful appendage to
the dominant estate and must benefit the possessor of the domi-
nant estate. Further, there must be an absence of evidence show-
ing that the parties to the easement agreement intended the ease-
while the Commission's authority (planning and regulation) relates to the manner
in which property is developed. 264 S.E.2d at 641.
48 Subdivision regulations are permitted under W. VA. CODE §§ 8-24-28 to -35
(1976 Replacement Vol.). In Singer, the commission had enacted some subdivision
regulations. The sufficiently specific ones were complied with and the insuffi-
ciently specific ones were not relied on in rejecting the plat.
11 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 45, at § 23.19.
:0 260 S.E.2d 291 (W. Va. 1979).
61 Under the law of West Virginia, a right of way is an easement only. Wells
v. Air Prod. and Chem., 383 F. Supp. 146 (N.D. W. Va. 1974).
52 Post v. Bailey, 110 W. Va. 504, 159 S.E. 524 (1931); Jones v. Island Creek
Coal Co., 79 W. Va. 532, 91 S.E. 391 (1917).
58 2 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 8.6 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
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ment to be in gross, which is a mere personal right extinguishable
on transfer. The court found these criteria were met and affirmed
a trial court ruling that the right of way was appurtenant to the
land.54
The servient estate owner argued on appeal that the ease-
ment could not be appurtenant to the land because the deed
which created it failed to use words of limitation in the granting
clause. 5 It was contended that because an easement appurtenant
to the land is an estate of inheritance, words of limitation were
necessary to create it.
The court disposed of this argument by relying on cases from
other jurisdictions which hold that words of limitation are not
necessary to create an easement appurtenant.5 6 Two of the cases
cited by the court for this proposition rely on state statutes that
make words of limitation unnecessary to create an estate of inher-
itance.5 7 Although West Virginia has a statute quite similar to the
ones relied on in those two cases,58 the Mays court did not apply
it to support its holding on this issue.
5 9
In regard to the second issue in Mays, the court found that
the deed creating the easement did impose some duty on the
owners of the dominant estate to maintain the road over the ease-
260 S.E.2d at 294.
' Words of limitation extend the created estate to an estate of inheritance.
Ball v. Payne, 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 73 (1827).
" Cleveland, C., C. & St. Louis Ry. v. Griswold, 51 Ind. App. 497, 97 N.E.
1030 (1912); Teachout v. Capital Lodge, 128 Iowa 380, 104 N.W. 440 (1905);
United States Pipeline Co. v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 62 N.J.L. 254, 41 A. 759
(1898).
5' IND. CODE ANN. § 32-1-2-14 (1973) is relied on expressly; IowA CODE ANN. §
557.2 (1950) is ppplied by a case on which Teachout v. Capital Lodge, 128 Iowa
380, 104 N.W. 440 (1905) directly based its holding: Karmuller v. Krotz, 18 Iowa
352 (1865).
" W. VA. CODE § 36-1-11 (1966) states in pertinent part:
When any real property is conveyed . .. to any person, ... and no
words of limitation are used in the conveyance ... such conveyance
... shall be construed to pass the fee simple, or the whole estate or
interest ... the ... grantor had power to dispose of, in such real prop-
erty, unless a contrary intention shall appear in the conveyance....
" Bennet v. Charles Corp., 226 S.E.2d 559 (W. Va. 1976) held that "[a]n
easement ... is an incorporeal hereditament and as such is a species of real prop-
erty ... subject to the provisions of the statutes governing the conveyance or
creation of estates in land." 226 S.E.2d at 563.
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ment, based on the language of the deed creating the easement.60
The court found itself "[un]prepared to address the question of
whether or not the owner of a dominant estate has an obligation
arising from law to maintain a road over an easement." '61 Thus,
the court's decision on this issue was grounded in the facts of the
case and not in law. Possibly, the court could have resolved the
problem on a non-factual basis by looking to Carson v. Jackson
Land and Mining Co., 2 wherein it was held that the law
presumes a duty to maintain on the party benefitting from the
easement, that is, the owner of the dominant estate.
Paul A. Billups
Nicholas L. DiVita
60 260 S.E.2d at 294.
61 Id. (emphasis added).
62 90 W. Va. 781, 111 S.E. 846 (1922).
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TAXATION
I. PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENT
Whether a third party taxpayer has standing to contest the
property assessments of other taxpayers in his county was the
controlling issue in Tug Valley Recovery Center, Inc. v. Mingo
County Commission.2 The companion cases before the court in-
volved the contesting of assessed values for coal lands owned by
one taxpayer in Mingo County, and the underassessment of all
coal lands in Lincoln County. The plaintiffs in each suit based
their complaints on the comparison between the values actually
assessed and those values arrived at as the "true and actual"
value by the appraisal conducted by the State Tax Commissioner
for all non-utility real property in the state.2
Not only did the court recognize that "any person who is ag-
grieved by any assessment shall have the right to appeal that as-
sessment,"3 but also that a taxpayer "may [force] .. .by writ of
mandamus" the county commission to assess property at its true
and actual value in accord with the State Tax Commissioner's ap-
praisal.4 The court noted that the "direct and substantial" inter-
est requirement for standing3 is met for every person affected by
the tax base since the lost tax revenues from an underassessment
are distributed to all other taxpayers in that particular county.
The remedy for an underassessment, though, is not a corre-
sponding reduction in the assessment of the contesting taxpayer's
property; rather, it is to compel the taxing authorities to assess all
property fully.6 The authority to compel the county taxing au-
thorities to properly assess property is vested by statute in the
circuit court.7 Consequently, if an aggrieved taxpayer has ex-
1 261 S.E.2d 165 (W.Va. 1979).
s W. VA. CODE § 1S-9A-11 (1977 Replacement Vol.).
3 261 S.E.2d at 170.
4Id.
5 Id. at 172.
1 See Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933); Bd. of County Comm'rs v.
Buch, 190 Md. 394, 58 A.2d 672 (1948).
7 W. VA. Code § 11-3-25 (1977 Replacement Vol.).
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hausted all administrative remedies, he has a right of appeal to
the circuit court which shall base its decision on the State Tax
Commissioner's appraisal. While the court dealt only with stand-
ing of a taxpayer contesting assessments in his home county, the
wording of the applicable statute is sufficiently broad to entitle
suits by taxpayers contesting assessments in counties other than
their own.8
The proper assessment of property was also in issue in In re
Assessment of U.S. Steel Corp.' The appellant, U.S. Steel, was
contesting the assessment of its coal properties at 108% of the
State Tax Commissioner's appraisal value, while the property of
all other coal companies in the county was assessed at 68% of its
appraised value. While the circuit court recognized the impropri-
ety of the assessment, it only reduced the appellant's assessment
to 100% of the appraisal value.10
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals noted that
county assessors are granted the "discretion to set the assessed
value of property between fifty and one hundred percent of the
appraised value.""' This discretion is limited however by the
West Virginia Constitution."2 In recognizing this limitation, the
court affirmed its decision in In re Assessment of Kanawha Val-
ley Bank"' which held:
Where there is a systematic plan to assess all property of a
certain species at a particular percentum of its value, a show-
ing that there were sporadic variations to the plan of assess-
ment will not deprive the owner of property of another species
of his right to relief under the provisions of Section 1, Article
X of the Constitution of this State, where the property of the
latter was assessed at a substantially higher percentum of ac-
tual value than the approximate level of valuation of the other
species of property of equal value.14
8 Id.
9 268 S.E.2d 128 (W.Va. 1980).
10 Id. at 131.
n W. VA. CODE § 18-9A-11 (1977 Replacement VoL); W. VA. CODE § 11-3-1
(Cum. Supp. 1980).
12 W. VA. CONsT. art. X, j 1 states that "No one species of property from
which a tax may be collected shall be taxed higher than any other species of prop-
erty of equal value."
Is 144 W.Va. 346, 109 S.E.2d 649 (1959).
14 Id. at 347, 109 S.E.2d at 651.
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Thus, a taxpayer may contest the assessment of his property
where the property of other taxpayers is assessed at a different
percent of its value. This is true even if the contesting taxpayer's
property is assessed at a value within the limitations imposed by
the statute. The taxpayer's remedy in such a case is to have the
assessed value of his property lowered to conform with the sys-
tematic assessment of other taxpayers.
II. EXPENDING SPECIAL SCHOOL LEVY FUNDS
The case of Thomas v. Board of Education of McDowell
County"5 dealt with the correct expenditure of funds derived from
a special levy passed by the voters of McDowell County in con-
junction with state minimum salary laws for school personnel.
The special levy in question had been adopted in 1974, and pro-
vided for a supplement to the state basic salary for teaching and
non-teaching employees. The terms of the levy had been com-
plied with until July 1, 1975, when a new state minimum salary
plan was implemented. 16 Subsequently, the county board of edu-
cation began applying the special levy funds for non-teaching em-
ployees toward the new state minimum salary amounts, thus
eliminating the benefits of the special levy supplement. The
county board was prompted to make this application based on a
determination by the State Department of Education and the
State Board of School Finance that "county special levy funds
could be used in computing the county's local share of financing
its schools."1
7
The court noted the general rule that "the purpose for which
funds were raised at a special election levy is to be determined by
the proposal approved by the voters at the polls," 8 and con-
cluded that the purpose intended in this case was to provide a
supplement to the state minimum salary for county non-teaching
261 S.E.2d 66 (W. Va. 1979).
l W.VA. CODE § 18A-4-8 (1977 Replacement Vol.).
17 261 S.E.2d at 70. The county's local share of financing its schools is gov-
erned by W.VA. CODE § 18-9A-11 (1977 Replacement Vol.) and is based on regular
county levies for general current expense purposes. This local share is deducted
from the county's "basic foundation program cost" (as determined by W.VA. CODE
§§ 18-9A-3 through 10 (1977 Replacement Vol.) in arriving at the amount of total
state aid to the county.
Is See, e.g., Haws v. County Court, 86 W.Va. 650, 104 S.E. 119 (1920).
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employees. The court further concluded that the state aid
formula, as computed under Chapter 18, Article 9A of the West
Virginia Code, does not require the inclusion of special levy funds
in determining the local share of school financing.19
The result of this decision is to prohibit county school boards
from expending special levy funds for any other purpose than
that approved by the county's voters.
John Kent Dorsey
19 261 S.E.2d at 71.
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TORTS
I. RETALIATORY DISCHARGE
Until 1978, an employee working under an at will employ-
ment contract could be discharged at any time and without
cause. In Harless v. First National Bank in Fairmont,2 the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals limited the employer's right
of summary dismissal to the extent that his motive does not con-
travene public policy.3 The Harless court restricted its holding to
an aflirmance of the plaintiff's cause of action; the full implica-
ti6ns of the court's departure from the established rule were not
addressed.4
In Shanholtz v. Monongahela Power Co., 5 the supreme court
ruled on the nature of its new cause of action for retaliatory dis-
charge. Shanholtz, the plaintiff, worked for the defendant under
an at will employment contract. In September, 1976, he filed a
claim for. occupational disease benefits; within a few weeks the
defendant discharged him.'
,7-Nearly three years after his dismissal, on August 14, 1979,
Shanholtz filed an action against his former employer. Alleging
that his discharge was in retaliation for his workmen's compensa-
tion claim, the plaintiff charged breach of the employment con-
tract. Shanholtz added a charge of humiliation, embarrassment
and damage to his reputation, proximately caused by the defen-
dant's "negligent, tortious and unlawful termination of his
employment."7
Wright v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 141 W.Va. 368, 90 S.E.2d 459
(1955); Resener v. Watts, Ritter & Co., 73 W.Va. 342, 80 S.E. 839 (1913). Accord,
Blackhurst v. E. 1. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 294 F.Supp. 128 (S.D. W. Va.),
afl'd, 405 F.2d 499 (4th Cir. 1968).
1 246 S.E.2d 270 .(W.Va. 1978).
3 Id.
4 Id., at 275, n. 5.
5 270 S.E.2d 178 (W.Va. 1980).
6 Shanholtz's letter of termination said only that he was "unable to satisfac-
torily fulfill [his] job requirements." Id. at 180.
7 Id. Another basis of his suit was breach of statutory duty under W.VA. CODE
§ 23-5A-1 (Cum. Supp. 1980), requiring that employers not discriminate against
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The plaintiff claimed recovery on both contract and tort the-
ories. The choice between the two theories became important af-
ter Monongahela Power Co. raised the affirmative defense that
the plaintiff's suit was barred by the statute of limitations., On
the defendant's motion the circuit court dismissed the action. It
ruled that an action for retaliatory discharge is a tort action, and
that the two-year limitation had expired before the suit was filed.
Despite the dismissal, the circuit court certified to the supreme
court questions about the nature of the action and the- effect of
the two-year statute of limitations.
The supreme court had to decide whether the retaliatory dis-
charge action sounds in tort or in contract. If the action is in tort,
Shanholtz's claim was invalid; if the action is in contract, the
plaintiff could continue the action. In making its decision, the
court relied on a footnote in Harless:
Since this case is before us on a certified question solely
on the issue of whether a cause of action exists, we do not
reach the issue of the element of damages except to say the
cause of action is one in tort and it therefore follows that rules
relating to tort damages would be applicable.10
In Shanholtz the court elevated this dictum to a rule, holding
that the action is in tort. The plaintiff's action was barred by the
tort statute of limitations."
employees because of attempts to receive workmen's compensation. The circuit
court and the supreme court rejected this theory, holding that the statute, effec.
tive on July 1, 1978, had only prospective application.
8 W.VA. CODE § 55-2-12 (1966).
9 The questions certified are:
1. Does an employee, under an at-will employment contract, have
a cause of action for breach of contract if the employer discharges him
in retaliation for filing a workmen's compensation claim, as stated in
Count I of the plaintiff's complaint, thereby bringing him within the
five-year rather than the two-year statute of limitations?
2. Is the cause of action stated in Counts II and III of plaintiff's
complaint barred by the two-year statute of limitations? 270 S.E.2d at
180.
10 246 S.E.2d at 275, n. 5 (emphasis added).
1 In reaching its holding the court considered the principle that "[a) com-
plaint that could be construed as being either in tort or on contract will be pre-
sumed to be on contract whenever the action would be barred by the statute of
limitation if construed as being in tort." Cochran v. Appalachian Power Co., 246
S.E.2d 624, 628 (W.Va. 1978). The court distinguished that principle. 270 S.E.2d
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The conclusion that a Harless type action is in tort is sup-
ported by more than a footnote. The tenor of the Harless opinion
reflects the court's understanding that it was dealing with a tort
action.12 The majority of other jurisdictions that allow an action
for retaliatory discharge follows the public policy rationale and
bases -the action in tort.1 3 The weight of scholarly opinion also
supports a tort theory.
1 4
Implicit in the court's development of retaliatory discharge
are several benefits. Because the action sounds in tort, the com-
plexities of contract law, such as implied convenants, mutuality of
obligation and waiver of restrictions, can be disregarded. 8 More-
over, plaintiffs can more easily recover damages for mental dis-
tress16 and punitive damages.
1 7
II. IMPLIED INDEMNITY
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals examined the
right to implied indemnity in Hill v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son,
at 182.
12 The Harless court sustained the plaintiff's tort cause of action for emo-
tional distress. See Monteleone v. Co-Operative Transit Co., 128 W.Va. 340, 36
S.E.2d 475 (1945).
,S S'ee, e.g., Perk v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir.
1979), citing Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974);
Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Nees v.
Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975). But see Fortune v. National Cash Regis-
ter Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130,
316 A.2d 549 (1974) (the court construed retaliatory discharge as a contract
action).
4 See Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1421-27 (1967);
Note, The Employment At Will Rule, 31 ALA. L. REV. 421, 444-45 (1980); Note, A
Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGS L.J.
1435, 1454-64 (1975). But see Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge Rights:
A Changing Concept of Employment At Will, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 467, 472-92 (1979);
Note, A Remedy for Malicious Discharge of the At Will Employee: Monge v.
Beebe Rubber Co., 7 CONN. L. REV. 758, 763-74 (1975).
15 Note, 31 ALA. L. REV., supra note 14, at 444; Note, 26 HASTINGS L.J., supra
note 14, at 1454-56.
11 See 246 S.E.2d at 276. See also Note, 31 ALA. L. REV., supra note 14. But
see Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (damages for mental
distress are recoverable in a contract action).
17 Note, 31 ALA. L. REV., supra note 14, at 445.
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Inc."' Implied indemnity arises from the relationship between the
party having to pay damages, the indemnitee, and the party
which caused the damages, the indemnitor. While the right to im-
plied indemnity has been acknowledged in West Virginia, 9 it has
not been fully discussed.
The plaintiff, Hill, was injured by a defective pipe. Hill sued
the supplier, Ryerson, on theories of strict liability in tort and
breach of implied warranty of fitness. Ryerson impleaded United
States Steel, the manufacturer, as a third-party defendant. The
trial court found U.S. Steel ultimately liable. In its appeal, U.S.
Steel did not challenge Ryerson's right to claim implied indem-
nity. Rather, it asserted defenses in an attempt to bar Ryerson's
claim. U.S. Steel claimed that Ryerson's recovery is limited by an
exculpatory provision in the sales contract, and that the indemni-
tee failed to give timely notice that damages were claimed from
it.20
U.S. Steel's first defense was a contractual limitation of lia-
bility printed on an order acknowledgment form. This provision
limited the buyer's remedy to replacement or refund of purchase
price. While exculpatory arrangements are not favored, this one
gained credence because both parties had commercial expertise.
The court set out several factors for determining unconscionabil-
ity inferred from past decisions21 and concluded that the exculpa-
tory provision was not essential to the sales contract between U.S.
Steel and Ryerson.22 It held that the trial court was right in refus-
268 S.E.2d 296 (W. Va. 1980).
' Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 683 n. 22 (W. Va.
1979).
20 Another issue that U.S. Steel raised had to do with admissibility of hearsay
evidence. The evidence in question was the defective pipe bearing the identifying
mark which connected it with U.S. Steel. The court held that the pipe was admis-
sible under the business record exception to the hearsay evidence rule. It was this
part of the court's opinion from which Justice Caplan dissented. 268 S.E.2d at
301, 311.
" Among factors listed by Justice Miller are: relative bargaining strength,
whether the limitation provision was bargained for as part of the contract,
whether the provision was central to the main purpose of the contract and
whether the provision offended public policy. 268 S.E.2d at 307-10. See Ashland
Oil, Inc. v. Donahue, 223 S.E.2d 433 (W.Va. 1976).
22 It is possible that U.S. Steel's limitation was not even part of the sales
contract. W. VA. CODE § 46-2-207 (1966) speaks of the effect of such additional
terms. This is known as the "battle of the forms." See R. NORDSTROM, LAW OF
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ing U.S. Steel the benefit of the limitation, thus continuing a tra-
dition of closely construing waivers and limitations of liability
and policing against unconscionability.2 3
In considering notice in implied indemnity, the supreme
court said that the indemnitor can be bound by the plaintiff with-
out notice if it is impleaded as a third-party defendant.24 Im-
pleading satisfies the common law notice requirement for implied
indemnity.25
The appellant also argued that, irrespective of the common
law requirements of indemnity, the Uniform Commercial Code25
demands notice. U.S. Steel's reliance on the U.C.C. was rejected
by the court. Justice Miller, writing for the majority, held that
the purposes underlying the U.C.C. were inapposite to a products
liability action21 The defense of lack of notice was unavailable to
U.S. Steel.28
in Hill, the West Virginia supreme court faced one of the
most confusing aspects of products liability-how the parallel
theories of warranty and strict liability can coexist. In its holding
the court favored the tort theory, but did not define to what ex-
tent strict liability in tort has eclipsed the U.C.C. warranty the-
SALS, § 37 (1970). Under § 46-2-207(2)(c) Ryerson, by its return form, clearly
objected to U.S. Steel's exculpatory provision. Since the parties did not agree on
this term, under § 46-2-207(3), it is not part of the contract of sale. 268 S.E.2d at
307.
23 See Lodge Distributing Co., Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 245 S.E.2d 157 (W. Va.
1978); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Donahue, 223 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1976); Note, Con-
tracts-Developing Concepts of Unconscionability, 80 W. VA. L. REv. 87 (1977).
W.VA. R. Civ. P. 14.
U Without notice the indemnity action still exists. However, the elements of
the case must be reestablished in separate litigation and the original judgment is
not binding on the indemnitor. 268 S.E.2d at 301.
" W. VA. CODE § 46-2-607(3)(a) (1966). See generally Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d
1371 (1966).
'" "We believe that the notice requirement of W. Va. Code, 46-2-607(3)(a), is
applicable to the ordinary commercial transaction ... this Code section should
not be extended into the product liability field." 268 S.E.2d at 302-03.
1 The court, by way of a dictum, elaborated on the relation between a theory
of strict liability and a breach of warranty theory. It noted the similarities be-
tween the strict liability standard set out in Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg.
Co. and the implied warranty theory delineated in Dawson v. Canteen Corp., 212
S.E.2d 82 (W. Va. 1975). The court then seemed to indicate that the two were
interchangeable. 268 S.E.2d at 304.
[Vol. 83
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ory.2 9 The primary differences between warranty and strict liabil-
ity in tort are notice, privity, the statute of limitations and
disclaimers. The Hill decision rejected the need for notice in a
products liability action, even between parties to the sales con-
tract. The court abolished the requirement of privity under a
warranty theory in Dawson v. Canteen Corp.30 It has been co-
gently asserted that the two-year tort statute of limitations con-
trols products liability actions, whether based on tort or war-
ranty.31  While disclaimers have not been negated, Hill
demonstrates that they will be strictly construed and voided if
unconscionable.32
West Virginia has joined the jurisdictions merging strict lia-
bility in tort and warranty, 3 3 a merger advantageous to the tort
theory. While the tort action is generally hailed as the simpler, 4
there are implications the court did not face. In the first place,
there are benefits found in the notice requirement.3 5 More impor-
tantly, the court's position defeats expressed legislative intent.
The legislature enacted the U.C.C. as positive law, and it is ex-
pressly applicable to cases of personal injury.3 6
Mark A. Ferguson
29 See Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 17 WEST. RES. L. Rv. 5 (1965), where the author discusses the
extent and the implications of this eclipse.
:0 212 S.E.2d 82 (W. Va. 1975).
1 Maynard v. General Elec. Co., 486 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1973).
3 It is puzzling that the court, having held that the U.C.C. is unsuited to
what is essentially a tort action, did not completely reject disclaimers. See Van-
dermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964);
Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between the
Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RUTGERS L. REv. 692,
711 (1965); Shanker, supra note 29, at 29-30. Nonetheless, U.C.C. § 2-302 uncon-
scionability is an effective device for disarming exculpatory provisions.
33 See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896; Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (1967),
rev'd on other grounds, 53 N.J. ,138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969).
3, See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod. Co., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962); Santor v. A and M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 64, 207
A.2d 305, 311 (1965).
35 Phillips, Notice of Breach in Sales and Strict Tort Liability Law: Should
There Be a Difference?, 47 IND. L.J. 457, 464-70 (1972); Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 1371
(1966).
" W. VA. CODE § 46-2-715(2)(b) (1966).
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
I. COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT
In Calloway v. State Workmen's Compensation Commis-
sioner,1 the claimant was employed as an outside salesman for an
auto supply company. His duties entailed going on out of town
trips to solicit new business. On the occasion in question the
claimant had completed his company business by midafternoon,
proceeded to visit several of the local taverns, and was involved in
an automobile accident later that night. Injuries received in the
accident were the basis of a claim for workmen's compensation.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, deciding this issue
for the first time, held that the claimant had made a substantial
deviation from the course of his employment and was therefore
not entitled to compensation. In so holding, the court adopted the
majority view of jurisdictions having workmen's compensation
laws similar to West Virginia.2
Generally, for an injury to be compensable it must have oc-
curred in the course of the employment, s and injuries received
while traveling on behalf of an employer's business are within the
course of employment and compensable. 4 It is a well settled rule
that traveling employees are within the course of their employ-
ment from the time they leave home on a business trip until they
return, for the self-evident reason that the traveling itself is a
large part of the job.5
One exception to this general rule is the case where the em-
ployee makes a distinct departure from his business purpose and
embarks upon a purely personal endeavor. In such a case the
1 268 S.E.2d 132 (W. Va. 1980).
2 For a general discussion of workmen's compensation law, see 1 LARSON,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 19.00 (1978). West Virginia's workmen's compensa-
tion law is found in W. VA. CODE § 23-1-1 et seq. (1978 Replacement Vol.).
' W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (1978 Replacement Vol.)..
E.g., Cymbor v. Binder Coal Co., 285 Pa. 440, 132 A. 363 (1926); Traynor v.
City of Buffalo, 208 A.D. 216, 203 N.Y.S. 590 (1924).
1 A well-reasoned decision on this point is Souza's Case, 316 Mass. 332, 55
N.E.2d 611 (1944).
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deviation from the business purpose takes the employee out of
the course of his employment so that any injury received during
such deviation will be noncompensable. However, if the deviation
is so slight that the business purpose is not interrupted it can be
disregarded as being insubstantial.7
A split of authority has developed over the question of
whether an employee who has completed a personal side trip and
is moving back toward his business route when injured should be
deemed to have resumed his employment as soon as he starts
back or only when he actually regains the main business route.
The majority of jurisdictions deny recovery where the injury oc-
curs after the employee has begun to move back toward the busi-
ness route on the theory that a side trip is a personal deviation
until completed. 8 The minority rule is that the course of employ-
ment is resumed when the return towards the business route is
commenced.9 Thus, an injury received while returning to the
business purpose from the personal deviation will be compen-
sated. The West Virginia court, in Calloway, adopted the major-
ity view and held that:
In the case of a major deviation from the business purpose,
compensation ordinarily will be barred on the theory that the
deviation is so substantial that the employee must be deemed
to have abandoned any business purpose and consequently
cannot recover for injuries received, even though he has ceased
the deviation and is returning to the business route or
purpose.10
In defining the term "major deviation," the court implied
that a case-by-case determination must be made considering fac-
tors such as the nature of the employment, the scope of the busi-
ness trip, any rules or instructions relating to the trip by the em-
6 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 19.00 (1979).
7 Id. See Shapaka v. State Compensation Comm'r, 146 W. Va. 319, 119
S.E.2d 821 (1961).
8 E.g., Public Service Co. v. Industrial Commission, 395 Ill. 238, 69 N.E.2d
875 (1946); Kayser v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 203 Minn. 578, 282 N.W. 801
(1938); Hess v. Catholic Knights of St. George, 149 Pa. Super. 575, 27 A.2d 542
(1942).
' London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Herndon, 81 Ga. App. 178, 58 S.E.2d
510 (1950).
20 268 S.E.2d at 133.
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ployer, past practices, length of the deviation, and the degree the
deviation varies from the normal business purpose. These are fac-
tors that most jurisdictions will consider in determining whether
a substantial or major deviation from business purpose has oc-
curred so as to deny compensation.11
II. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Fakourey v. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner12 held
that the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner should advise
claimants appearing in their own behalf in hearings before the
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board that they are entitled to
and encouraged to retain counsel to represent them. However, the
court declined to hold that a claimant has a constitutional right
to have appointed counsel.
The right to counsel in administrative proceedings must
necessarily find its support in due process concepts since the ex-
press provisions for the assistance of counsel in the United States
Constitution are contained in the sixth amendment and apply
only to criminal prosecutions."' Under a due process analysis it
has been well established that there is no constitutional right to
the assistance of counsel in administrative proceedings which are
purely investigatory rather than adjudicatory in nature.1' How-
ever, the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, in respect to
its authority to hear, adjust, and determine claims for compensa-
tion,5 has powers that are generally regarded as judicial in nature
rather than merely investigatory.'8 That being the case, due pro-
cess would not be met where there was. a denial of counsel. 17 It
would appear that as a minimum a claimant would be entitled to
representation by retained counsel if he so desired. In West Vir-
;1 Kinkead v. Management & Engineering Corp., 103 S.W.2d 545 (Mo. 1937);
Sawtell v. Stern Brothers & Co., 226 Mo. App. 485, 44 S.W.2d 264 (1931); Murano
v. Chrysler Corp., 19 A.D.2d 942, 244 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1963).
12 258 S.E.2d 526 (W. Va. 1979).
Brownlow v. Miers, 28 F.2d 653 (5th Cir. 1928).
14 Bowles v. Baer, 142 F.2d 787 (7th Cir. 1944).
W. VA. CODE § 23-5-3 (1978 Replacement Vol.).
See Yosemite Lumber Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 187 Cal. 774, 204 P. 226
(1922); Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 407, 156 P. 491 (1916);
Cook v. Massey, 38 Idaho 264, 220 P. 1088 (1923).
7 See Hyun v. Landon, 219 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1955).
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ginia this conclusion is further supported by the fact that the leg-
islature has statutorily provided for the regulation of attorney's
fees."8 This contemplates that assistance of counsel will be
allowed.
Given the fact that a claimant has the right to retain the as-
sistance of counsel if he so wishes, it does not follow that a claim-
ant who cannot afford counsel has the constitutional right to have
one appointed for him. Generally, the appointment of counsel for
indigents is based upon the due process and equal protection
clauses of the constitution. If a person is denied the assistance of
counsel merely because he cannot afford one, then he has been
denied the equal protection of the laws.1' The area of greatest
application of this concept has been in criminal proceedings.
Under the present system of adjudicating workmen's com-
pensation appeals, a claimant usually enters into a contingency
contract for legal representation. Thus, a claimant's ability to re-
tain legal representation is not dependent upon his ability to pay
at the time of contracting for the services. Failure to provide such
a claimant with appointed counsel would not deprive him of legal
representation, and is not necessary to afford equal protection of
the laws.
The court did take a somewhat liberal stance by recom-
mending to the commissioner that he advise claimants appearing
on their own behalf that they are entitled to and encouraged to
retain counsel. Most jurisdictions hold that a claimant need not
be informed of his right to counsel and that failure to do so will in
no way invalidate the proceeding. 20
Jeffery K. Matherly
'a W. VA. CODE § 23-5-5 (1978 Replacement Vol.).
19 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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